Rulemaking Requirements from the Executive Office of the President

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Lead Agency:

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

This section discusses the most significant presidential Executive Orders, Bulletins, and Memoranda, which pertain to the rulemaking process or federal regulation. Other executive orders and memoranda may be found in other sections, e.g., those relating to the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

More information on many of these matters can be found on the website of OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), and through the Administrative Conference's Table of Executive Order Requirements.

Executive Orders

Other White House Bulletins and Memoranda

Overview

History of Presidential Oversight of Rulemaking and Regulation

Presidential oversight of regulation is not a recent innovation. It has been in effect, in one form or another, since 1971, and it accompanied a major expansion in the scope and complexity of federal regulation that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s when a number of important social and environmental regulatory statutes were enacted.

In June 1971, President Nixon established a “Quality of Life Review” program, under which all “significant” draft proposed and final rules were submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which circulated them to other agencies for comment. Agencies were required to submit a summary of their proposals, a description of the alternatives that had been considered, and a cost comparison of alternatives. In practice, this program applied to rules pertaining to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational health and safety.

In 1974, President Ford issued an executive order requiring executive branch agencies to prepare an “inflation impact statement” for each “major” federal action. The order empowered the Director of OMB to administer the program, with authority to delegate functions to other agencies, including the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS). Under the Inflation Impact Statement program, agencies were required to prepare an inflation impact statement (IIS) for “major” rules prior to publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), and then to forward a summary of the IIS to COWPS upon publication of the NPRM. COWPS would review the IIS and, in its discretion, offer informal criticism of the proposal or participate in the public proceedings on the rule.

President Carter continued presidential review of agency rules by means of Executive Order 12,044, issued in 1978. Under the order, executive agencies were required to: (1) publish semi-annual agendas, describing and giving the legal bases for, any “significant” regulations under development by the agency; (2) establish procedures to identify “significant” rules, to evaluate their need, and to have the agency head assure that the “least burdensome of the acceptable alternatives” was proposed; and (3) prepare a “regulatory analysis” that examined the cost-effectiveness of alternative regulatory approaches for “major rules.”

President Carter also established a Regulatory Analysis Review Group to review the regulatory analyses prepared for a limited number of proposed “major” rules and to submit comments on the proposed rules during the public comment period. He created another rulemaking review body, the Regulatory Council, which was charged with coordinating agency rulemaking to avoid duplication of effort or conflicting policy in regulation of any area. These efforts to coordinate agency rulemaking were challenged unsuccessfully in several lawsuits.

President Reagan acted quickly after taking office to increase control over executive branch rulemaking. On February 17, 1981, the President issued an executive order on federal regulations designed “to reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations.” The new Executive Order 12,291 replaced Executive Order 12,044, which President Reagan said had “proven ineffective.”

Executive Order 12,291 contained both substantive requirements and procedural steps to be followed in the development and promulgation of new rules. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget was given responsibility for implementing Executive Order 12,291. OMB’s rulemaking review function is supplemented by the powers it was given in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, by which Congress statutorily established OIRA to, among other things, review and approve or disapprove agency “information collection requests.”

The Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice issued an opinion supporting the validity of Executive Order 12,291. The opinion stated that the President’s authority to issue the order was based on his constitutional power to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” While concluding that any inquiry into Congressional intent in enacting specific rulemaking statutes “will usually support the legality of presidential supervision of rulemaking by Executive Branch agencies,” the opinion stated that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking “is more readily justified when it does not purport wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion which Congress had allocated to a particular subordinate official.”

Despite criticism of this new form of presidential review, President Reagan began his second term by expanding the program through Executive Order 12,498, which established a “regulatory planning process” with the purpose of helping to “ensure that each major step in the process of rule development is consistent with Administration policy.”

According to OMB, the problem with regulatory review under Executive Order 12,291 was that such review “often came late in the regulatory process, after huge investments of agency time and resources, and often after agency staff commitments to constituents had made it extremely difficult to consider any legally acceptable, but previously ignored, regulatory alternative.” This resulted, OMB said, in the “bureaucracy often present[ing] agency heads with faits accompli.”

Executive Order 12,498’s regulatory planning process was designed to avoid this problem. Under this procedure, the head of each agency was required to determine at the beginning of the regulatory process whether a proposed regulatory venture was “consistent with the goals of the Administration.” At the beginning of the year, Agency heads were to develop a plan for managing the agency’s most significant regulatory actions. OMB then reviewed the plan for consistency with the administration’s program and published the coordinated agency plans in a government-wide document. This document, entitled Regulatory Program of the United States Government, governed more than 20 major rulemaking agencies and was published each year during the second Reagan term and the Bush administration to inform Congress and the public of the government’s regulatory plans.

President Reagan, in 1987 and 1988, issued three additional executive orders, dealing with federalism, interference with property rights (which is still in effect), and the family. OMB was given a role in ensuring coordination of regulatory policy in these areas. President Bush basically continued the program of presidential review of agency rulemaking established by President Reagan, although due to Congressional opposition to OIRA actions, President Bush’s nominee to head OIRA was not confirmed. To counter this weakening of OIRA’s authority, President Bush created the Council on Competitiveness, headed by Vice President Quayle, and gave it authority to intervene in major agency rulemakings. Several of the Council’s interventions provoked intense criticisms leading up to the 1992 elections.

The Clinton Executive Order—Executive Order 12,866

With the election of President Clinton, one of his first actions was an attempt to reestablish some bipartisan consensus on rulemaking review. His nominee as OIRA Administrator was the first subcabinet nominee to be appointed. Following the example of the Reagan Administration, President Clinton then set out to redraft the extant Executive Order, and produced Executive Order 12,866 on September 30, 1993. This Order, which remains operative, carries over many of the principles of E.O. 12,291 (and E.O. 12,498), which it superseded, but it also made some significant modifications that simplified the process, made it more selective, and introduced more transparency into the OMB/agency consultations. In drafting this Order, the Clinton Administration followed many of the suggestions of the Administrative Conference in its Recommendation 88-9, “Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking.”

The Order begins with a lengthy “Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles,” which are quite similar to those in Executive Order 12,291 except that it takes pains to specify that measurement of costs and benefits should include both quantifiable and qualitative measures. As with previous Orders, Executive Order 12,866 retains the traditional (since 1978) level of $100 million annual effect on the economy for those major rules (now referred to as “economically significant” rules) that must be accompanied by cost-benefit assessments when forwarded to OIRA as proposed and final rules.

Executive Order 12,866 also retains the OIRA review process for other rules, although it only requires that “significant regulatory actions” be subject to review. This includes those $100 million rules plus others that have material adverse effects on “the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” It also includes rules that may materially alter the budgetary impact of benefit programs or the rights of recipients, that raise “novel legal or policy issues” or are inconsistent or interfere with actions taken by another agency. The process established for identifying such “significant regulatory actions” relies on agency identification of them in the first instance, vetted by OIRA. Rules that are not so identified may be issued without OIRA review. This selectivity streamlined the review process considerably, and made it possible to include, for the first time, a deadline (of 90 days, with one 30-day extension allowed) for completion of OIRA review. In the event of an unresolved dispute between OIRA and the agency, the Vice President is directed to make the decision (or recommend one to the President).

The review process set forth in the Order made significant improvements in transparency. Following an ACUS recommendation closely, the Order provides that after the agency has concluded its rulemaking it should make available to the public all submissions to OIRA, and identify all changes made in the rule, noting those made at the behest of OIRA. In addition, OIRA, for its part, must regularize the way it receives any outside communications concerning an agency rule that is subject to review. Only the Administrator or her designee may receive such communications. OIRA must forward any such communications to the agency within ten days, invite agency officials to any meetings held with outsiders, and maintain a public log of all such contacts. At the end of the proceeding OIRA must also make available all documents exchanged with the agency.

In place of the Reagan E.O. 12,498 on regulatory planning, the Clinton Order establishes its own yearly planning mechanism. It continues the semiannual publication of the Unified Regulatory Agenda, which lists all proposed, pending and completed regulatory and deregulatory actions. And it requires that the October Agenda contain each agency’s annual Regulatory Plans, which must be approved personally by the agency head. These plans must be forwarded to OIRA (and then on to affected agencies, the Vice President and a group of named high-level White House Advisors) by June 1 of each year. The plans are supposed to also include agency determinations on which existing rules are to be reviewed and reconsidered during the ensuing year, and “preliminary estimates of the anticipated costs and benefits” of each rule planned for that calendar year. These actions do not represent any sharp break from the practices of previous administrations. However, Executive Order 12,866 is a departure in one regard—for the first time the independent regulatory agencies are specifically directed to comply with the planning and agenda provisions (though not with the rule-review process).

The Clinton Executive Order was generally well received by most observers of the regulatory scene. Its basic approach has remained fundamentally unchanged since its issuance, and OIRA has worked out a stable and workable relationship with the agencies in administering it. The once rather vibrant legal and policy debate over the pros and cons of presidential review has gradually evolved into a fairly broad agreement that it is not only legal, but that if properly administered, it is essential to effective executive branch management. Nevertheless, there has been some serious criticism of OIRA’s failure to meet the deadlines set in the Order.

President Clinton also issued a presidential directive on plain language, and number of other executive orders that remain in effect, concerning: environmental justice in minority populations and low-income populations (E.O. 12,898), civil justice reform (E.O. 12,988), protection of children from environmental risks (E.O. 13,045), federalism (E.O. 13,132), and consultation with Indian Tribal Governments (E.O. 13,175).

President Bush continued the use of Executive Order 12,866, although he did make several significant changes. In 2002, he made some small changes in Executive Order 13,258, basically removing the Vice President from the process. In January 2007, in Executive Order 13,422, he made more fundamental changes. Most significantly he added a requirement that “significant guidance documents” also be reviewed by OIRA in a way similar to significant regulatory actions. He also required that agencies identify in writing specific “market failures” that necessitate a rulemaking, that agency Regulatory Policy Officers be presidential appointees, that these officers must approve the Regulatory Plan, that aggregate costs and benefits for all rules must be included in the Regulatory Plan, and that agencies consider whether to use “formal” (“on the record”) rulemaking for “complex determinations”. However, as mentioned below, President Obama, upon assuming office, revoked the Bush changes and reinstated the original Clinton order. However, by later memorandum, the requirement that significant guidance documents be reviewed by OIRA was reinstated.

OIRA did issue a memorandum in September 2001, putting its own stamp on the E.O. 12,866 process. The memorandum describes the “general principles and procedures that will be applied by OMB in the implementation of E.O. 12,866 and related statutory and executive authority.”

Significantly, during the Bush Administration, OIRA also announced several new initiatives in its review process. First, it made extensive use of its website to publish its guidelines and other information pertaining to its review process and specific rule reviews. This continues today. Second, it began the practice of issuing public “return letters” that send rules back to the agency for reconsideration, “review letters” that comment on aspects of a particular rule review, and “prompt letters,” which are sent on OMB’s initiative and contain suggestions for new or stronger regulations. While these letters are still posted on reginfo.gov, the Obama and the Trump Administrations have made little use of this practice.

More importantly, during the Bush Administration, OMB also issued four far-reaching documents affecting the regulatory process that remain in effect today. In 2003 it issued a revised OMB Circular A-4, which provides guidance on the development of regulatory analyses. OMB also issued a more far-reaching and controversial “Peer Review Bulletin” in December 2004, which requires administrative agencies to conduct a peer review on all “influential regulatory information that the agency intends to disseminate.” Finally, in 2007, OMB issued an important new government-wide “Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices.” It also (along with the Office of Science and Technology Policy) issued a set of “Updated Principles for Risk Analysis.” In so doing it declined to finalize a Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin that the two agencies had issued in January 2006, in favor of updating the Clinton Administration’s Principles issued in 1995. Finally, President Bush issued two other executive orders concerning regulations that remain in effect today: (1) analysis of adverse effects on energy supply, distribution, or use (E.O. 13,211) and (2) proper consideration of small entities in agency rulemaking (E.O. 13,272).

Developments in the Obama Administration

Shortly after taking office, President Obama revoked the Bush Amendments to Executive Order 12,866 and directed the Director of OMB, in consultation with regulatory agencies, to produce a set of recommendations for a new executive order on federal regulatory review within 100 days, followed by an unusual request for public comments on the same subject. Almost 200 public comments were received.

After about a year of internal consideration, the White House finally settled on its approach to OMB review—basically to reaffirm Executive Order 12,866. It did so on January 18, 2011, with Executive Order 13,563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.” In Section 1(b), the Order stated: “This order is supplemental to and reaffirms the principles, structures, and definitions governing contemporary regulatory review that were established in Executive Order 12866 . . . .”

It did contain a few new mandates and points of emphasis. Most notably, agencies were urged (as appropriate and within legal constraints) to (1) consider “values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts”; (2) “afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment through the Internet on any proposed regulation, with a comment period that should generally be at least 60 days”; (3) “provide, for both proposed and final rules, timely online access to the rulemaking docket on regulations.gov, including relevant scientific and technical findings, in an open format that can be easily searched and downloaded”; (4) for proposed rules, provide “an opportunity for public comment on all pertinent parts of the rulemaking docket, including relevant scientific and technical findings”; (5) seek public input from affected persons “[b]efore issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking”; (6) “identify and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice”; (7) “promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned”; and (8) “[w]ithin 120 days of the date of this order, . . . develop and submit to [OIRA] a preliminary plan” for periodically reviewing “its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so as to make the agency’s regulatory program more effective or less burdensome in achieving the regulatory objectives.”

The one action mandate in the new Executive Order was for agencies to develop plans for retrospective review of their existing regulations. On May 26, 2011, the OIRA Administrator announced the results of this effort. On July 11, 2011, President Obama issued a follow-up Executive Order extending the terms of E.O. 13,563 to independent regulatory agencies. On September 15, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,707, titled “Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People.” Noting the value of insights from behavioral science to improve the “effectiveness and efficiency of Government.”

Developments in the Trump Administration

Shortly after taking office, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” which requires agencies to identify at least two regulations to be repealed for every proposed or promulgated regulation. The cost of each new regulation must be fully offset by the repeal specified above, and the agency must provide an approximation of the total costs or savings associated with each new regulation or repealed regulation. All regulations must be included in the Unified Agenda, and during the federal budget process, the OMB Director must identify to agencies a total amount of incremental costs of regulations permitted for that fiscal year. The order directed the Director of OMB to provide agency heads with guidance addressing the processes for measuring regulatory costs, the costs of existing regulations, what qualifies as new and offsetting regulations, and situations that would require waivers of the order’s requirements. OIRA issued Guidance Implementing Executive Order 13771, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs” to assist agencies in carrying out these requirements.

President Trump also issued Executive Order 13,777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda.” This order requires the head of each agency to designate an official as its Regulatory Reform Officer (RRO) who would implement initiatives and policies including the EO 13,771, EO 12,866, and Section 6 of EO 13,563 regarding retrospective review. All agencies must also form a Regulatory Reform Task Force made up of the RRO, the Regulatory Policy Officer, a representative from the central policy office, and three senior agency officials if the agency is listed in 31 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1) (the executive departments, EPA, and NASA), which “shall evaluate existing regulations . . . and make recommendations to the agency head regarding their repeal, replacement, or modification.” In making these determinations, the task forces should focus on regulations that (1) “eliminate jobs, or inhibit job creation;” (2) “are outdated, unnecessary, or ineffective;” (3) “impose costs that exceed benefits;” (4) “create serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with regulatory initiatives and policies;” (5) “are inconsistent with the requirements of section 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001, . . . in particular those regulations that rely in whole or in part on data, information, or methods that are not publicly available or that are insufficiently transparent to meet the standard for reproducibility; or” (6) “derive from or implement Executive Orders or other Presidential directives that have been subsequently rescinded or substantially modified.” The Executive Order also requires agency heads to prioritize regulations that the Regulatory Reform Task Force identifies as outdated, unnecessary, or ineffective when implementing regulatory offsets under E.O. 13,771.

Finally, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,783, “Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,” which directs agencies to review regulations that “potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources and appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind those that unduly burden the development of domestic energy resources. . . .” This order also revoked Executive Order 13,653, “Preparing the United States for the Impact of Climate Change,” and memoranda under the Obama Administration related to climate change.


Bibliography

Congressional Documents

  • Oversight Hearing on “Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation?” House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Committee of the Judiciary (Feb 13, 2007).
  • Regulatory Reform, Hearing before the House Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, 108th Cong. (Nov. 17, 2004) (statement of John D. Graham, Administrator of OIRA), http:// www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/testimony/graham/111704_graham_ reg_reform.html.
  • H.R. REP. NO. 115-119 (2017). OIRA INSIGHT, REFORM, AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-115hrpt19/pdf/CRPT-115hrpt19-pt1.pdf

https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/assessing-obama-years-oira-regulatory-impacts-jobs-wages-economic-recovery/

OMB Documents

Reports to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations

  • Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (Sept. 30, 1997), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_rcongress/. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,352 (July 22, 1997).
  • Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (January 1999), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport1998.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,034 (Aug. 17, 1998), extended 63 Fed. Reg. 49,935 (Sept. 18, 1998).
  • Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (June 2000), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/ inforeg/2000fedreg-report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 65 Fed. Reg. 1296 (Jan. 7, 2000); extended 65 Fed. Reg. 4447 (Jan. 27, 2000) and 65 Fed. Reg. 7198 (Feb. 7, 2000).
  • Making Sense of Regulation, 2001 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (December 2001), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,041 (May 2, 2001); extended 66 Fed. Reg. 34,963 (July 2, 2001).
  • Stimulating Smarter Regulation, 2002 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (December 2002), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2002_report_to_congress.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014 (Mar. 28, 2002).
  • Informing Regulatory Decisions, 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (September 2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2003_cost-ben_final_rpt.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,772 (Apr. 1, 2003).
  • Progress in Regulatory Reform, 2004 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (December 2004), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2004_cb_final.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 69 Fed. Reg. 7987 (Feb. 20, 2004).
  • Validating Regulatory Analysis, 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (December 2005), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 70 Fed. Reg. 14,735 (Mar. 23, 2005).
  • 2006 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (January 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/inforeg/2006_cb/ 2006_cb_final_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,213 (Apr. 13, 2006).
  • 2007 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (June 2008) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/ 2007_cb/2007_cb_final_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,061 (Mar. 12, 2007).
  • 2008 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (January 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ information_and_regulatory_affairs/2008_cb_final.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169 (Sept. 24, 2008).
  • 2009 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ legislative_reports/2009_final_BC_Report_01272010.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,101 (Sept. 21, 2009).
  • 2010 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (July 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/reports/ 2010_Benefit_Cost_Report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 75 Fed. Reg. 22,630 (Apr. 29, 2010).
  • 2011 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (June 2011) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/ 2011_cba_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,260 (Apr. 1, 2011).
  • 2012 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (April 2013) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2012_cb/ 2012_cost_benefit_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,003 (Apr. 12, 2012).
  • 2013 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (May 2014) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2013_cb/ 2013_cost_benefit_report-updated.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,780 (May. 21, 2013).
  • 2014 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (June 15, 2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/ 2014_cb/2014-cost-benefit-report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,776 (July 2, 2014).
  • 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT (Mar. 10, 2016).
  • 2016 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT (Dec. 23, 2016).
  • 2017 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT (Feb. 23, 2018).

Other OMB Documents

  • Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government (1987-1988) (and through 1990-91).
  • Office of Management and Budget, Report on Executive Order No. 12,866, 59 Fed. Reg. 24,293 (1994).
  • Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, More Benefits Fewer Burdens—Creating a Regulatory System that Works For the American People, A Report to the President on the Third Anniversary of Executive Order 12,866 (1996), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ OMB/inforeg/3_year_report.html.

ACUS Documents

Recommendations

  • 88-9 Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking
  • 93-4 Improving the Environment for Agency Rulemaking
  • 95-3 Review of Existing Agency Regulations
  • 2011-6 International Regulatory Cooperation
  • 2012-5 Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities
  • 2013-2 Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent Regulatory Agencies
  • 2014-5 Retrospective Review of Agency Rules
  • 2015-1 Promoting Accuracy and Transparency in the Unified Agenda
  • 2017-3 Plain Language in Regulatory Drafting
  • 2017-6 Learning from Regulatory Experience
  • 2018-1 Paperwork Reduction Act Efficiencies

Other ACUS Documents

  • Statement #18, Improving the Timeliness of OIRA Regulatory Review, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013)

NOTE FOR CHRISTINA/TORI UPDATE ALL ACUS REPORT CITATIONS AND REORDER BELOW BY AUTHOR'S LAST NAME

  • background report by Joseph E. Aldy, Learning from Experience: An Assessment of the Retrospective Reviews of Agency Rules and the Evidence for Improving the Design and Implementation of Regulatory Policy, available at http://www.acus.gov/report/retrospective-review-report).
  • Curtis W. Copeland, Length of Rule Reviews by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, available at www.acus.gov/ report/oira-review-report)
  • Curtis W. Copeland, Economic Analysis and Independent Regulatory Agencies, available at www.acus.gov/report/economic-analysis-final-report).
  • Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, available at www.acus.gov/report/consultants-report-improving-coordination-relatedagency-responsibilities
  • Sidney Shapiro at Reports and Recommendations of the Admin. Conf. of the U.S., 1994-1995 at 407
  • Michael McCarthy, International Regulatory Cooperation, 20 Years Later: Updating ACUS Recommendation 91-1, available at www.acus.gov/report/international-regulatory-cooperation-final-report).
  • 2018-1 Report
  • 2017-6 Report
  • 2017-3 Report
  • background report by Curtis W. Copeland, Promoting Accuracy and Transparency in the Unified Agenda, available at www.acus.gov/report/final-unified-agenda-report).

CRS Documents

  • Maeve P. Carey, Cong. Research Serv., The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview, RL32240 (June 17, 2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ misc/RL32240.pdf.
  • Maeve P. Carey, Cong. Research Serv., Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process, R41974 (Dec. 9, 2014), http:// digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc501649/m1/1/high_res_d/R41974_ 2014Dec09.pdf.
  • Vivian S. Chu & Daniel T. Shedd, Cong. Research Serv., Presidential Review of Independent Regulatory Commission Rulemaking: Legal Issues, R42720 (Sept. 10, 2012), http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/ metadc227809/m1/1/high_res_d/R42720_2012Sep10.pdf.
  • Vivian S. Chu & Daniel T. Shedd, Cong. Research Serv., Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation, RS20846 (Apr. 6, 2014), http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc287968/m1/1/high_res_d/ RS20846_2014Apr16.pdf.
  • Curtis Copeland, Cong. Research Serv., Changes to the OMB Regulatory Review Process by Executive Order 13422, RL33862 (Jan. 3, 2008), https://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/RL33862.pdf.
  • Curtis Copeland, Cong. Research Serv., Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, RL32397 (June 9, 2009), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32397.pdf.

GAO Documents

  • Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Be Useful in Assessing Environmental Regulations, Despite Limitations (GAO/RCED84-62) (Apr. 6, 1984).
  • Federalism: Implementation of Executive Order 12612 in the Rulemaking Process (T-GGD-99-93) (May 5, 1999).
  • Federalism: Previous Initiatives Have Had Little Effect on Agency Rulemaking (GAO/T-GGD-99-31) (June 30, 1999).
  • Regulatory Accounting—Analysis of OMB’s Reports on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation (GAO/ GGD-99-59) (April 1999).
  • Regulatory Burden: Recent Studies, Industry Issues, and Agency Initiatives (GAO/GGD-94-28) (Dec. 13, 1993).
  • Regulatory Burden: Measurement Challenges Raised by Selected Companies (GAO/GGD-97-2) (Nov. 18, 1996).
  • Regulatory Reform: Agencies Could Improve Development, Documentation and Clarity of Regulatory Economic Analysis (GAO/RCED-98-142) (May 26, 1998).
  • Regulatory Reform: Changes Made to Agencies’ Rules Are Not Always Clearly Documented (GAO/GGD-98-31) (January 1998).
  • Regulatory Reform: Information on Costs, Cost-Effectiveness, and Mandated Deadlines for Regulations (GAO/ PEMD-95-18BR) (Mar. 8, 1995).
  • Regulatory Takings: Implementation of Executive Order on Government Actions Affecting Private Property Use (GAO-03-1015) (September 2003).
  • Rulemaking: OMB’s Role in Reviews of Agencies’ Draft Rules and the Transparency of Those Reviews (GAO03-929) (September 2003).
  • Environmental Justice: EPA Should Devote More Attention to Environmental Justice When Developing Clean Air Rules (GAO-05-289) (July 25, 2005).
  • Improvements Needed to Monitoring and Evaluation of Rules Development as Well as to the Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews GAO-09-205 (Apr. 20, 2009).
  • International Regulatory Cooperation: Agency Efforts Could Benefit from Increased Collaboration and Interagency Guidance (GAO-13-588) (August 2013).
  • Regulatory Review Processes Could Be Enhanced (GAO-14-423T) (Mar. 11, 2014).
  • Reexamining Regulations: Agencies Often Made Regulatory Changes, but Could Strengthen Linkages to Performance Goals (GAO-14-268) (April 2014).
  • Environmental Regulation: EPA Should Improve Adherence to Guidance for Selected Elements of Regulatory Impact Analyses (GAO-14-519) (July 2014).
  • Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Included Key Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis, but Explanations of Regulations’ Significance Could Be More Transparent (GAO-14-714) (September 2014).
  • Regulatory Guidance Processes: Selected Departments Could Strengthen Internal Control and Dissemination Practices (GAO-15-368) (April 2015).
  • GAO-15-718, FEDERAL USER FEES: KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATORY FEES (2015).
  • GAO-16-720, REGULATORY GUIDANCE PROCESSES: TREASURY AND OMB NEED TO REEVALUATE LONG-STANDING EXEMPTIONS OF TAX REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE (2016).
  • GAO-18-22, FEDERAL REGULATIONS: KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AGENCY DESIGN AND ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS (2017).
  • GAO-18-183, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: OMB SHOULD WORK WITH AGENCIES TO IMPROVE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT COMPLIANCE DURING AND AT THE END OF PRESIDENTS’ TERMS (2018).

Other Government Documents

  • Office of Legal Counsel, Op. on Additional Procedures Concerning OIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498.
  • Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 59 (Feb. 13, 1981), 1981 WL 30877. Also available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/DJMemoReaganEO12291PDF.pdf.
  • Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Justice Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act (Dec. 10, 1997), http:// www3.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/ej_guidance_nepa_ ceq1297.pdf.
  • Environmental Protection Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970-1992—Draft Report for Congress (April 1997).
  • National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dep't of Commerce, Tenth Annual Report on Federal Agency Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and Conformity Assessment (2007).
  • Office of the Vice President, Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less, Improving Regulatory Systems, National Performance Review (1993).

Selected Books and Articles

  • Administrative Law Review, OIRA Thirtieth Anniversary Conference, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (special ed. 2011).
  • A.B.A. Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice, Report: Improving the Administrative Process: A Report to the President-Elect of the United States (2016), 69 Admin. L. Rev. 205 (2017).
  • Rebecca Adams, Regulating the Rule-Makers: John Graham at OIRA, CQ Weekly 520 (Feb. 23, 2002).
  • Robert A. Anthony, Executive Order, OMB Bulletin Focus on Guidances, 32 Admin. L. & Reg. News 10 (Spring 2007).
  • William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence Over Rulemaking, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 611 (2002).
  • Donald R. Arbuckle, Obscure But Powerful: Who Are Those Guys?, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 131 (2011).
  • Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260 (2006).
  • Stephen J. Balla, Jennifer M. Deets, & Forrest Maltzman, Outside Communications and OIRA Review of Agency Regulations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 149 (2011).
  • Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 Yale L.J. 1732 (2014).
  • Josh Blackman, Presidential Maladministration, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 397 (2018).
  • James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 Duke L. J. 851 (2001).
  • Alexander Bolton, Rachel Augustine Potter, & Sharece Thrower, Organizational Capacity, Regulatory Review, and the Limits of Political Control, 32 J. L. Econ. & Org. 242 (2016).
  • Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47 (2006).
  • Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Legitimacy, Selectivity, and the Disunitary Executive: A Reply to Sally Katzen, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1511 (2007).
  • Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533 (1989).
  • Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and Rulemaking Petitions, 67 Admin. L. Rev. 265 (2015).
  • Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 347 (2017).
  • John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882 (2015).
  • Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 Yale J. on Reg. Online 57 (2013).
  • Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 Admin. L. Rev. 43 (2017).
  • Cary Coglianese, Improving Regulatory Analysis at Independent Agencies, 67 Am. U.L. Rev. 733 (2018).
  • Daniel Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 55 (2012).
  • John Conyers, Jr., Henry C. Johnson, Jr., & David N. Cicilline, The Dangers of Legislating Based on Mythology: The Serious Risks Presented by the Anti-Regulatory Agenda of the 115th Congress and the Trump Administration, 54 Harv. J. On Legis. 365 (2017).
  • Curtis Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1257 (2006).
  • Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration’s Use and Abuse of Rulemaking. Part I: The Rise of OIRA, 28 Admin. & Reg. L. News 8 (Summer 2003).
  • Stephen Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821 (2003).
  • Nestor M. Davidson &. Ethan J. Lieb, Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond, 103 Geo. L.J. 259 (2015).
  • Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075 (1986).
  • Christopher DeMuth, OIRA at Thirty, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 15 (2011).
  • Caroline DeWitt, Comment, The Council on Competitiveness: Undermining the Administrative Procedure Act with Regulatory Review, 6 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 759 (1993).
  • Susan E. Dudley, Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 113 (2011).
  • Susan E. Dudley, Improving Regulatory Accountability: Lessons From the Past and Prospects for the Future, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1027 (2015).
  • E. Donald Elliott, TQM’ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167 (1994).
  • Jaclyn L. Falk, Comment, The Behind Closed Door Policy: Executive Influence in the Environmental Protection Agency’s Informal Rulemaking, 47 U.S.F. L. Rev. 593 (2013).
  • Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 227 (1998).
  • Scott Farrow, Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Executive Office Oversight Matter?, AEI Publication (Dec. 2001).
  • Arthur Fraas, Observations on OIRA’s Policies and Procedures, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 79 (2011).
  • Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent Regulatory Commissions, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 213 (2011).
  • William Funk “Agency Oversight by the Political Branches,” Chapter 11 in Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, A Guide to Judicial and Political Review of Federal Agencies 259-304 (2d ed. Michael E. Herz, Richard Murphy & Kathryn Watts eds., 2015).
  • Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Disclosing the Impact, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 299 (1991).
  • John D. Graham & Cory R. Liu, Regulatory and Quasi-Regulatory Activity Without OMB and Cost-Benefit Review, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 425 (2014).
  • John D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 Fordham Urb. L. J. 953 (2006).
  • Wendy L. Gramm, Regulatory Review Issues, October 1985–February 1988, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 27 (2011).
  • Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123 (1994).
  • Robert W. Greene, Improving U.S. Financial Regulation Through OIRA Review & Robust Regulatory Analysis Standards, 14 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 89 (2016).
  • Sarah Grimmer, Note, Public Controversy Over Peer Review, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 275 (2005).
  • Hiba Hafiz, Economic Analysis of Labor Regulation, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1115 (2017).
  • Robert W. Hahn, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results From Regulation, (New York: Oxford University Press and AEI Press, 1996).
  • Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 233 (1991).
  • Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1097 (2006).
  • Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 325 (2014).
  • Thomas D. Hopkins, The Evolution of OIRA Oversight—CWPS to OIRA, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 71 (2011).
  • Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001).
  • Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on “Inside the Administrative State,” 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1497 (2007).
  • Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 103 (2011).
  • Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy (4th ed. CQ Press 2011).
  • Peter Ketcham-Colwill, Presidential Influence Over AgencyRulemaking Through Regulatory Review, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1622 (Oct. 2014).
  • Robert E. Litan & William D. Nordhaus, Reforming Federal Regulation (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1983).
  • Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609 (2014).
  • Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 Geo. L.J. 1337 (2013)
  • Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking, (5th ed.) (American Bar Association) (2012).
  • Jeffrey S. Lubbers, OMB to Require Peer Review for Regulatory Science Documents, 29 Admin. L. & Reg. News 3 (Fall 2003).
  • Maureen Mahon, Note, Proceed With Caution: The Implications of the OMB Peer Review Guidelines on Precautionary Legislation, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 461 (2006).
  • Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2016).
  • Randolph J. May, OMB’s Peer Review Proposal—Swamped by Science? 29 Admin. & Reg. L. News 4 (Spring 2004).
  • Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443 (1987).
  • Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L.J. 1671 (2012).
  • Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush II Administration, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 179 (2011).
  • Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 Duke L.J. 1763 (2012).
  • Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127 (2010).
  • Nina Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2455 (2011).
  • Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 447 (2014).
  • Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239 (2017).
  • James C. Miller III, The Early Days of Reagan Regulatory Relief and Suggestions for OIRA’s Future, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 93 (2011).
  • Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1986).
  • William A. Niskanen, Clinton Regulation Will Be “Rational”: Interview with Sally Katzen, the New OIRA Administrator, Regulation Magazine No. 3, at 36 (1993), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1993/7/v16n3-4.pdf.
  • Lars Noah, Peer Review and Regulatory Reform, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,606 (2000).
  • Paul Noe, Analyzing the Destruction of Human Capital by Regulations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 203 (2011).
  • Note, Regulatory Analyses and Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 91 Yale L. J. 739 (1982).
  • Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 994 (2011).
  • Note, The Inflation Impact Statement Program: An Assessment of the First Two Years, 26 Am. U. L. Rev. 1138 (1977).
  • Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1755 (2013).
  • Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2016).
  • Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev. 889 (2008).
  • Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 Va. J. Nat. Resources 1, 75-77 (1984).
  • Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016).
  • Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L. J. 963 (2001).
  • Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2487 (2011).
  • Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Budget: The Regulatory Budget Debate, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 249 (2016).
  • Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 124 Yale L.J. Forum 246 (2015).
  • Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan L. Rev. 1189 (1986).
  • Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State: The Case of Financial Services Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 545 (2017).
  • Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 1423 (2014).
  • Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health (Oxford University Press 2008).
  • Delissa Ridgway et al., The Council on Competitiveness and Regulatory Review: A “Kinder, Gentler” Approach to Regulation?, 6 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 691 (1993).
  • David B. Rivkin, The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch Rulemaking, 7 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 309 (1993).
  • Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 193 (1981).
  • Arden Rowell, Time in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 4 UC Irvine L. Rev. 1215 (2014).
  • Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 335 (2011).
  • Andrew Rudalevige, Old Laws, New Meanings: Obama’s Brand of Presidential “Imperialism”, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2016).
  • J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
  • Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
  • Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161 (1995).
  • David R. Sheaffer, The Price of Regulation: Rethinking Executive Review of Agency Rulemaking, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1091 (2016).
  • Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,064 (2004).
  • Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Revised Peer Review Bulletin, 29 Admin. L. & Reg. News 10 (Summer 2004).
  • Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Constraining White House Political Control of Agency Rulemaking Through the Duty of Reasoned Explanation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1457 (2015).
  • Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 577 (2011).
  • Stuart Shapiro, OIRA Inside and Out, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 135 (2011).
  • Stuart Shapiro & Deanna Moran, The Checkered History of Regulatory Reform Since the APA, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2016).
  • Stuart Shapiro & Debra Borie-Holtz, The Politics of Regulatory Reform (Routledge 2013).
  • Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696 (2007).
  • Peter L. Strauss, The President and the Constitution, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1151 (2015).
  • Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 181 (1986).
  • Cass R. Sunstein, Simpler: The Future of Government (Simon & Schuster, 2013).
  • Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838 (2013).
  • Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 579 (2014).
  • Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 37 (2011).
  • Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943 (1980).
  • Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2017).
  • Adam L. Warber, Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislating from the Oval Office (Lynne Reiner Publishers 2006).
  • Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2016).
  • Christopher E. Wilson, Comment: Not Good Enough for Government Work: How OMB’s Good Guidance Practices May Unintentionally Complicate Administrative Law, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 177 (2007).

Miscellaneous

  • National Academy of Public Administration, Presidential Management of Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies (1987).
  • Center for Regulatory Effectiveness at http://www.thecre.com/ ombpapers/centralrev.html.
  • Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ten Thousand Commands at https://cei.org/10KC.
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