Difference between revisions of "Rulemaking Requirements from the Executive Office of the President"

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This section discusses the most significant presidential Executive Orders, Bulletins, and Memoranda, which pertain to the rulemaking process or federal regulation. Other executive orders and memoranda may be found in other sections, e.g., those relating to the [[Federal Advisory Committee Act]].
 +
 
'''Lead Agency:'''
 
'''Lead Agency:'''
  
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
+
[https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/ Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)], [https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ Office of Management and Budget (OMB)]
  
This section contains the text of the most significant presidential Executive Orders, Bulletins, and Memoranda, effective as of November 1, 2015, which pertain to the rulemaking process or federal regulation. Other executive orders and memoranda may be found in other sections, e.g., those relating to the [[Federal Advisory Committee Act]].
+
==Executive Orders==
 +
<div style="column-count:3;-moz-column-count:3;-webkit-column-count:3">
 +
*Executive Order 12372, [https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12372.html Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs], 47 Fed. Reg. 30959 (July 16, 1982).
 +
*Executive Order 12630, [https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12630.html Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights], 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 18, 1988).
 +
*Executive Order 12866, [https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf Regulatory Planning and Review], 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 ( Oct. 4, 1993).
 +
*Executive Order 12889, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1994-01-03/pdf/WCPD-1994-01-03-Pg2639.pdf Implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement], 58 Fed. Reg. 69681 (Dec. 30, 1993).
 +
*Executive Order 12898, [https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12898.pdf Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations], 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
 +
*Executive Order 12988, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1996-02-12/pdf/WCPD-1996-02-12-Pg189.pdf Civil Justice Reform], 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996).
 +
*Executive Order 13045, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1997-04-23/pdf/97-10695.pdf Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks], 62 Fed. Reg. 19885 (Apr. 23, 1997).
 +
*Executive Order 13132, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-08-10/pdf/99-20729.pdf Federalism], 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 10, 1999).
 +
*Executive Order 13175, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2000-11-09/pdf/00-29003.pdf Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments], 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 9, 2000).
 +
*Executive Order 13211, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2001-05-22/pdf/01-13116.pdf Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use], 66 Fed. Reg. 28355 (May 22, 2001).
 +
*Executive Order 13272, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2002-08-16/pdf/02-21056.pdf Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking], 67 Fed. Reg. 53461 (Aug. 16, 2002).
 +
*Executive Order 13563, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/2011-1385.pdf Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review], 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (supplementing and reaffirming Executive Order 12866).
 +
*Executive Order 13579, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-07-14/pdf/2011-17953.pdf Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies], 76 Fed. Reg. 41587 (July 14, 2011).
 +
*Executive Order 13609, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2012-05-04/pdf/2012-10968.pdf Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation], 77 Fed. Reg. 26413 (May 4, 2012).
 +
*Executive Order 13610, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2012-05-14/pdf/2012-11798.pdf Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens], 77 Fed. Reg. 28469 (May 14, 2012).
 +
*Executive Order 13707, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-09-18/pdf/2015-23630.pdf Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People], 80 Fed. Reg. 56356 (Sept. 18, 2015).
 +
*Executive Order 13725, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-04-20/pdf/2016-09346.pdf Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Works to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy], 81 Fed. Reg. 23417 (Apr. 20, 2016).
 +
*Executive Order 13783, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-03-31/pdf/2017-06576.pdf Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth], 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
 +
*Executive Order 13924, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery], 85 Fed. Reg. 31353 (May 22, 2020).
 +
</div>
  
It contains the texts of the following Presidential Orders in chronological order—that have remained in effect. More information on many of these matters can be found on the website of OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/regulatory-matters/. Additional information may also be found through the Administrative Conference's [https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/tables-executive-order-requirements Table of Executive Order Requirements].
+
==Table of Executive Order Requirements==
 
 
==Executive Orders==
 
 
{| class="wikitable"
 
{| class="wikitable"
 
|+
 
|+
!
+
!Executive Order (EO)
!
+
!Date and Administration of Issue
!
+
!Action Items
!
+
!Does the EO Contain a Statement Regarding Applicability to Independent Agencies?
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12630.html EO 12630 - Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights]
 +
|1988 - Reagan
 +
|''General Principles''. Each agency “shall be guided by” the principles set forth in the EO when “formulating or implementing policies that have takings implications.”
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Safety''. These principles include the point that “the mere assertion of a . . . safety purpose is insufficient to avoid a taking.”  They should be undertaken only for “real and substantial threats,” be designed to significantly advance safety, “and be no greater than is necessary.”
 +
 
 +
''Criteria.'' To the extent permitted by law, agencies are required to comply with a set of criteria before undertaking covered actions that include an assessment identifying the risk, establishing that safety is substantially advanced and that restrictions are not disproportionate to the overall risk, and estimating the cost to the government if the action is found to be a taking. In the event of an emergency, the analysis can be done later.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Policies That Have Takings Implications.'' These include proposed and final rules that if implemented “could effect a taking” (e.g., licenses, permits, or other conditions or limitations on private property use).
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Ensuring Compliance.'' OMB and the Department of Justice are responsible for ensuring compliance with the EO.
 +
|No
 
|-
 
|-
|
+
|[https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/EO_12866.pdf EO 12866 - Regulatory Planning and Review]
|
+
|1993 - Clinton
|
+
|See [https://www.acus.gov/appendix/executive-order-12866-regulatory-planning-and-review 12866 table]
|
+
|See [https://www.acus.gov/appendix/executive-order-12866-regulatory-planning-and-review 12866 table]
 
|-
 
|-
|
+
|[https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12889.pdf EO 12889 - Implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement]
|
+
|1993 - Clinton
|
+
|''Notice.'' Agencies subject to the APA must provide at least a 75-day comment period for “any proposed Federal technical regulation or any Federal sanitary or phytosanitary measure of general application.”
|
+
 
 +
 
 +
''Exceptions''
 +
 
 +
#NAFTA Implementation. Regulations ensuring that the NAFTA Implementation Act is appropriately implemented on the date NAFTA enters into force (pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §3314(a)).
 +
#Perishable Goods. Technical regulations relating to perishable goods.
 +
#Urgent Safety or Protection Rules. Technical regulations addressing an “urgent problem” relating to safety or to protection of human, animal, or plant life or health; the environment; or consumers.
 +
#Urgent Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection. Regulations addressing an “urgent problem” relating to sanitary or phytosanitary protection.
 +
 
 +
''Definitions''
 +
 
 +
#Technical Regulations. These are defined in the Trade Agreements Act at 19 U.S.C. §2576 b(7).
 +
#Sanitary or Phytosanitary Measures. These are defined at 19 U.S.C. §2575 b(7).
 +
|No
 
|-
 
|-
|
+
|[https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12898.pdf EO 12898 - Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations]
|
+
|1994 - Clinton
|
+
|''Strategies.'' Each agency is required to develop a strategy that “identifies and addresses disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations” and identify, among other things, rules that should be revised to meet the objectives of the Order.
|
+
 
 +
 
 +
''Conduct''. Each agency must ensure that its programs, policies, and activities that “substantially affect human health or the environment” do not exclude persons (including populations) from participating in or getting the benefits of, or subject them to discrimination under, such programs, policies, and activities.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Documents and Hearings''. An agency’s public documents, notices, and hearings relating to human health and the environment must be “concise, understandable, and readily accessible.”
 +
|Yes. See § 6–604 for relevant text: "Independent agencies are requested to comply with the provisions of this order."
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1996-02-07/pdf/96-2755.pdf EO 12988 - Civil Justice Reform]
 +
|1996- Clinton
 +
|Within budgetary constraints and executive branch coordination requirements, agencies must review existing and new regulations to ensure they comply with specific requirements (e.g., “eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity” and “provide a clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard”) to improve regulatory drafting in order to reduce needless litigation. In conducting the reviews, agencies must “make every reasonable effort” to ensure that the rule meets specific objectives (e.g., specifies in clear language the preemptive or retroactive effect, if any). Agencies must determine that the rule meets the applicable standards or that it is unreasonable to meet one or more of those standards.
 +
|Yes. See § 6 for relevant text: "The term 'agency' shall be defined as that term is defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code."
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1997-04-23/pdf/97-10695.pdf EO 13045 - Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks]
 +
|1997 - Clinton
 +
|''Policy.'' With respect to its rules, “to the extent permitted by law and appropriate, and consistent with the agency’s mission,” each agency must “address disproportionate risks to children that result from environmental health risks or safety risks.”
 +
''Analysis.'' For any substantive rulemaking action that “is likely to result in” an economically significant rule that concerns “an environmental health risk or safety risk that an agency has reason to believe may disproportionately affect children,” the agency must provide OMB/OIRA:
 +
 
 +
#Evaluation: “an evaluation of the environmental health or safety effects [attributable to products or substances that the child is likely to come in contact with or ingest] of the planned regulation on children.”
 +
#Alternatives: “an explanation of why the planned regulation is preferable to other potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives considered by the agency.”
 +
|Yes. See § 1–102 for relevant text: "Each independent regulatory agency is encouraged to participate in the implementatoin of this order and comply with its provisions."
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1999-08-10/pdf/99-20729.pdf EO 13132 - Federalism]
 +
|1999 - Clinton
 +
|See [https://www.acus.gov/appendix/executive-order-13132-federalism 13132 table]  
 +
|See [https://www.acus.gov/appendix/executive-order-13132-federalism 13132 table]  
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-11-09/pdf/00-29003.pdf EO 13175 - Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments]
 +
|2000 - Clinton
 +
|See [https://www.acus.gov/appendix/executive-order-13175-consultation-and-coordination-indian-tribal-governments 13175 table]
 +
|See [https://www.acus.gov/appendix/executive-order-13175-consultation-and-coordination-indian-tribal-governments 13175 table]
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-05-22/pdf/01-13116.pdf EO 13211 - Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use]
 +
|2001 - Bush
 +
|''Statement of Energy Effects.'' Agencies are required to prepare and submit to OIRA a Statement of Energy Effects for significant energy actions, to the extent permitted by law.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Significant Energy Action.'' A “significant energy action” is one that is “significant” under EO 12866 and is likely to have a significant adverse energy effect. Additionally, actions designated by the OIRA Administrator as “significant energy actions” are significant energy actions.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Contents of Statement.'' Agencies must provide a detailed statement of “any adverse effects on energy supply, distribution, or use (including a shortfall in supply, price increases, and increased use of foreign supplies)” for the action and reasonable alternatives and their effects.  
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Publication.'' Agencies must publish the Statement or a summary in the related NPRM and final rule.
 +
|Yes. See § 4(b)(2) for relevant text: "'Agency' means any authority of the United States . . . other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies . . . ."
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2002-08-16/pdf/02-21056.pdf EO 13272 - Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking]
 +
|2002 - Bush
 +
|''Advocacy Review.'' Agencies must “notify” Advocacy of draft rules that may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities when the draft rule is submitted to OIRA under EO 12866 or, if submission to OIRA is not required, “at a reasonable time prior to publication of the rule.” Advocacy is authorized to submit comments on the draft rule.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Consideration of Advocacy Comments.'' Agencies must give “every appropriate consideration” to any Advocacy comments on a draft rule. If consistent with legal requirements, agencies must include in final rule preambles their response to any written Advocacy comments on the proposed rule, unless the agency head certifies that the public interest is not served by such action.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Agency Procedures.'' Agencies must issue written procedures ensuring that the potential impact of their draft rules on small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and small organizations are “properly considered.”
 +
|Yes. See § 4 for relevant text: "Terms defined in section 601 of title 5 . . . including the term 'agency,' shall have the same meaning in this order."
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/2011-1385.pdf EO 13563 - Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review]
 +
|2011 - Obama
 +
|''General Principles.'' This EO supplements and reaffirms [https://www.acus.gov/appendix/executive-order-12866-regulatory-planning-and-review EO 12866], stressing that, to the extent permitted by law, each agency must ensure that the benefits of its rulemaking actions justify their costs, tailor their regulations to impose the least burden, consider cumulative burdens, maximize net benefits, use performance objectives, and assess available alternatives.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Public Participation.'' Agencies must provide a “meaningful opportunity” for public comment (generally 60 days) through the internet, with “timely” and easy access to all “pertinent” documents. Prior to issuing NPRMs, agencies should seek “the views of those likely to be affected,” when “feasible and appropriate.”
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Integration and Innovation.'' Each agency must promote “coordination, simplification, and harmonization” across agencies to reduce redundant, inconsistent, or overlapping rules. Agencies must also seek to achieve goals “designed to promote innovation.”
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Flexible Approaches.'' Agencies must consider “approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice.”
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Objectivity with regard to scientific information.'' Agencies must “ensure the objectivity of any scientific and technological information and processes” supporting their rulemaking.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
''Retrospective Analysis.'' Agencies must consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules. They must have a plan to “periodically review” their existing significant regulations to make them “more effective or less burdensome.”
 +
|Yes. See § 7(a) for relevant text: "For purposes of this order, 'agency' shall have the meaning set forth in section 3(b) of [https://www.acus.gov/appendix/executive-order-12866-regulatory-planning-and-review <nowiki>[EO] 12866</nowiki>]."
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-07-14/pdf/2011-17953.pdf EO 13579 - Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies]
 +
|2011 - Obama
 +
|Independent regulatory agencies should promote EO 13563's goal of protecting “public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation,” and should comply with the provisions of EO 13563. Independent regulatory agencies should conduct retrospective analyses of rules to determine if they are “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome.” Each independent agency should publish their analyses online when possible, and should develop a plan within 120 days of the EO's issuance to periodically review its regulations to determine if any should be “modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed.”
 +
|Yes. The EO is entirely geared toward independent agencies.
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-04/pdf/2012-10968.pdf EO 13609 - Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation]
 +
|2012 - Obama
 +
|Every agency must include in its Regulatory Plan under EO 12866 (if required to submit one) a summary of international regulatory cooperation activities. All agencies must also ensure that regulations with international impacts are designated as such in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (Unified Agenda), on regulations.gov, and on reginfo.gov. Additionally, agencies must consider reforming significant regulations that create “unnecessary differences” between U.S. and international regulatory systems. Agencies are also required to consider any regulatory approaches abroad that the U.S. has agreed to consider under a regulatory cooperation council work plan.
 +
|Yes. See § 4(a): "'Agency' means any authority of the United States that is an 'agency' . . . other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5)"; and § 5: "Independent reegulatory agencies are encouraged to comply with the provisions of this order" for relevant text.
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-14/pdf/2012-11798.pdf EO 13610 - Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens]
 +
|2012 - Obama
 +
|Agencies are instructed to institutionalize regular reviews of their preivously issued significant regulations, and take additional steps to increase public participation in retrospective review of regulations. Agencies shall regularly (on the second Monday of January and July of each year) report on the status of their retrospective review efforts to OIRA. Reports should contain: progress on review, anticipated accomplishments, and proposed timelines. Agencies must make available to the public the final reports within three weeks from the date of submission of the draft report to OIRA.
 +
|Yes. See § 5(b) for relevant text: "'[A]gency means any authority of the United States that is an 'agency' . . . other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5)."
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-04-20/pdf/2016-09346.pdf EO 13725 - Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy]
 +
|2016 - Obama
 +
|Agencies must identify specific actions they can take to address “undue burdens” on competition, via pro-competitive rulemaking and regulations. Semiannual reports to the National Economic Council on actions meant to promote greater competition are also required.  
 +
|Yes. See § 3(b) for relevant text: "Independent agencies are strongly encouraged to comply with the requirements of this order."
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-08/pdf/2017-02762.pdf EO 13772 - Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System]
 +
|2017 - Trump
 +
|Federal regulation of the United States financial system is governed by seven core principles: 1) increasing informed consumer choice; 2) avoiding “taxpayer-funded bailouts”; 3) performing more rigorous regulatory impact analysis that addresses systemic risk and market failures, such as moral hazard and information asymmetry; 4) enabling American competitiveness in domestic and foreign markets; 5) promoting American interests in international financial regulatory negotiations; 6) making regulation efficient and appropriately tailored; and 7) restoring public accountability within federal financial regulatory agencies. The Secretary of the Treasury must consult with the heads of the member agencies of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, and must report to the President periodically on the extent to which the federal financial system's regulatory framework promotes the Core Principles, and what actions have been taken, and are currently underway, to promote the Core Principles.
 +
|No
 +
|-
 +
|[https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-03-31/pdf/2017-06576.pdf EO 13783 - Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth]
 +
|2017 - Trump
 +
|All agencies are required to immediately review all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and other agency actions that “potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources,” especially oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy. Agency actions mandated by law, necessary for the public interest, or are otherwise consistent with this order's policy statement (promoting clean and safe development of American energy resources while preserving federalism between the states and the federal government on regulatory issues) are exempt. Any agency action identified in this review must begin “as soon as practicable” to be wound down in compliance with APA procedures and EO 13771. Agencies should no longer base their cost-benefit analyses on previously-issued Technical Support Documents and Technical Updates of the Social Cost of Carbon issued from February 2010 through August 2016.
 +
|No
 
|}
 
|}
A. Executive Order 12,372: Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs (1982).
+
 
B. Executive Order 12,630: Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights (1988).
 
C. Executive Order 12,866: Regulatory Planning and Review (1993).
 
D. Executive Order 12,889: Implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (1993).
 
E. Executive Order 12,898: Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations (1994).
 
F. Executive Order 12,988: Civil Justice Reform (1996).
 
G. Executive Order 13,045: Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks (1997).
 
H. Executive Order 13,132: Federalism (1999).
 
I. Executive Order 13,175: Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments (2000).
 
J. Executive Order 13,211: Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use (2001).
 
K. Executive Order 13,272: Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking (2002).
 
L. Executive Order 13,563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review (2011) (supplementing and reaffirming E.O. 12866).
 
M. Executive Order 13,579: Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies (2011).
 
N. Executive Order 13,609: Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation (2012).
 
O. Executive Order 13,610: Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens (2012).
 
P. Executive Order 13,707: Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People (2015)
 
Q. Executive Order 13,771: Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs (2017)
 
R: Executive Order 13,777: Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda (2017)
 
T: Executive Order 13,783: Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth (2017)
 
 
 
==Other White House Bulletins and Memoranda==
 
==Other White House Bulletins and Memoranda==
 
+
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
A. OMB Director’s Memorandum: “Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Standards” (1998).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Circular-119-1.pdf Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities] (1998).
B. Presidential Memorandum: “Plain Language in Government Writing” (1998).
+
*[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1998-06-10/pdf/98-15700.pdf Plain Language in Government Writing] (1998).
C. OIRA Guidance on Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking (2001).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/pubpress/2001-38-attach.pdf Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by OIRA] (2001).
D. OIRA Memorandum: “OMB’s Circular No. A-4, New Guidelines for the Conduct of Regulatory Analysis” (2004).  
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/memo_pmc_a4.pdf OMB’s Circular No. A-4, New Guidelines for the Conduct of Regulatory Analysis] (2004).
E. OMB’s Peer Review Bulletin (2004).
+
*M-05-03, [https://www.cio.noaa.gov/services_programs/pdfs/OMB_Peer_Review_Bulletin_m05-03.pdf Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review] (2004).
F. Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices (2007).
+
*[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2007-01-25/pdf/E7-1066.pdf Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices] (2007).
G. OMB/OSTP, Memorandum, “Updated Principles for Risk Analysis”(2007).
+
*M-07-24, [https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2007/m07-24.pdf Updated Principles for Risk Analysis](2007).
H. OIRA Memorandum M-17-21: “Guidance Implementing Executive Order 13771, Titled ‘Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs’”
+
*M-17-24, [https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-24.pdf Guidance for Section 2 of Executive Order 13783, titled “Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth”] (2017).
I. OIRA Memorandum M-17-23: “Guidance on Regulatory Reform Accountability Under Executive Order 13777, titled ‘Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda’”
+
*M-19-14, [https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/M-19-14.pdf Guidance on Compliance with the Congressional Review Act] (2019).
J. OIRA Memorandum M-17-24: “Guidance for Section 2 of Executive Order 13783, titled “Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth’”
+
</div>
K. OMB Memorandum M-17-22: “Comprehensive Plan for Reforming the Federal Government and Reducing the Federal Civilian Workforce”
 
  
 
==Overview==
 
==Overview==
 
===History of Presidential Oversight of Rulemaking and Regulation===
 
===History of Presidential Oversight of Rulemaking and Regulation===
Presidential oversight of regulation is not a recent innovation. It has been in effect, in one form or another, since 1971, and it accompanied a major expansion in the scope and complexity of federal regulation that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s when a number of important social and environmental
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Presidential oversight of regulation is not a recent innovation. It has been in effect, in one form or another, since 1971, and it accompanied a major expansion in the scope and complexity of federal regulation that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s when a number of important social and environmental regulatory statutes were enacted.  
regulatory statutes were enacted.  
 
  
 
In June 1971, President Nixon established a “Quality of Life Review” program, under which all “significant” draft proposed and final rules were submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which circulated them to other agencies for comment. Agencies were required to submit a summary of their proposals, a description of the alternatives that had been considered, and a cost comparison of alternatives. In practice, this program applied to rules pertaining to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational health and safety.
 
In June 1971, President Nixon established a “Quality of Life Review” program, under which all “significant” draft proposed and final rules were submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which circulated them to other agencies for comment. Agencies were required to submit a summary of their proposals, a description of the alternatives that had been considered, and a cost comparison of alternatives. In practice, this program applied to rules pertaining to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational health and safety.
  
In 1974, President Ford issued an executive order requiring executive branch agencies to prepare an “inflation impact statement” for each “major” federal action.  The order empowered the Director of OMB to administer the program, with authority to delegate functions to other agencies, including the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS). Under the Inflation Impact Statement program, agencies were required to prepare an inflation impact statement (IIS) for “major” rules prior to publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), and then to forward a summary of the IIS to COWPS upon publication of the NPRM. COWPS would review the IIS and, in its discretion, offer informal criticism of the proposal or participate in the public proceedings on the rule.   
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In 1974, President Ford issued an executive order requiring executive branch agencies to prepare an “inflation impact statement” for each “major” federal action.  The order empowered the Director of OMB to administer the program, with authority to delegate functions to other agencies, including the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS). Under the Inflation Impact Statement program, agencies were required to prepare an inflation impact statement (IIS) for “major” rules prior to publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), and then to forward a summary of the IIS to COWPS upon publication of the NPRM. COWPS would review the IIS and, in its discretion, offer informal criticism of the proposal or participate in the public proceedings on the rule.   
  
President Carter continued presidential review of agency rules by means of Executive Order 12,044, issued in 1978.5 Under the order, executive agencies were required to: (1) publish semi-annual agendas, describing and giving the legal bases for, any “significant” regulations under development by the agency; (2) establish procedures to identify “significant” rules, to evaluate their need, and to have the agency head assure that the “least burdensome of the acceptable alternatives” was proposed; and (3) prepare a “regulatory analysis” that examined the cost-effectiveness of alternative regulatory approaches for “major rules.”
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President Carter continued presidential review of agency rules by means of Executive Order 12044, ''Improving Government Regulations'', issued in 1978. Under the order, executive agencies were required to: (1) publish semi-annual agendas, describing and giving the legal bases for, any “significant” regulations under development by the agency; (2) establish procedures to identify “significant” rules, to evaluate their need, and to have the agency head assure that the “least burdensome of the acceptable alternatives” was proposed; and (3) prepare a “regulatory analysis” that examined the cost-effectiveness of alternative regulatory approaches for “major rules.”
  
President Carter also established a Regulatory Analysis Review Group to review the regulatory analyses prepared for a limited number of proposed “major” rules and to submit comments on the proposed rules during the public comment period.6 He created another rulemaking review body, the Regulatory Council, which was charged with coordinating agency rulemaking to avoid duplication of effort or conflicting policy in regulation of any area. These efforts to coordinate agency rulemaking were challenged unsuccessfully in several lawsuits.
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President Carter also established a Regulatory Analysis Review Group to review the regulatory analyses prepared for a limited number of proposed “major” rules and to submit comments on the proposed rules during the public comment period. He created another rulemaking review body, the Regulatory Council, which was charged with coordinating agency rulemaking to avoid duplication of effort or conflicting policy in regulation of any area. These efforts to coordinate agency rulemaking were challenged unsuccessfully in several lawsuits.
  
President Reagan acted quickly after taking office to increase control over executive branch rulemaking. On February 17, 1981, the President issued an executive order on federal regulations designed “to reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations.”  The new Executive Order 12,291 replaced Executive Order 12,044, which President Reagan said had “proven ineffective.”  
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President Reagan acted quickly after taking office to increase control over executive branch rulemaking. On February 17, 1981, the President issued an executive order on federal regulations designed “to reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations.”  The new Executive Order 12291, [https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12291.html Federal Regulation], replaced Executive Order 12044, which President Reagan said had “proven ineffective.”  
  
Executive Order 12,291 contained both substantive requirements and procedural steps to be followed in the development and promulgation of new rules. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget was given responsibility for implementing Executive Order 12,291. OMB’s rulemaking review function is supplemented by the powers it was given in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, by which Congress statutorily established OIRA to, among other things, review and approve or disapprove agency “information collection requests.”
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Executive Order 12291 contained both substantive requirements and procedural steps to be followed in the development and promulgation of new rules. The [https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/ Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)] in OMB was given responsibility for implementing Executive Order 12291. OMB’s rulemaking review function is supplemented by the powers it was given in the [[Paperwork Reduction Act]] of 1980, by which Congress statutorily established OIRA to, among other things, review and approve or disapprove agency “information collection requests.”
  
The Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice issued an opinion supporting the validity of Executive Order 12,291. The opinion stated that the President’s authority to issue the order was based on his constitutional power to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” While concluding that any inquiry into Congressional intent in enacting specific rulemaking statutes “will usually support the legality of presidential supervision of rulemaking by Executive Branch agencies,” the opinion stated that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking “is more readily justified when it does not purport wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion which Congress had allocated to a particular subordinate official.”
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The Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice issued an [https://www.justice.gov/file/22586/download opinion] supporting the validity of Executive Order 12291. The opinion stated that the President’s authority to issue the order was based on his constitutional power to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” While concluding that any inquiry into Congressional intent in enacting specific rulemaking statutes “will usually support the legality of presidential supervision of rulemaking by Executive Branch agencies,” the opinion stated that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking “is more readily justified when it does not purport wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion which Congress had allocated to a particular subordinate official.”
  
Despite criticism of this new form of presidential review, President Reagan began his second term by expanding the program through Executive Order 12,498, which established a “regulatory planning process” with the purpose of helping to “ensure that each major step in the process of rule development is consistent with Administration policy.”  
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Despite criticism of this new form of presidential review, President Reagan began his second term by expanding the program through Executive Order 12498, [https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12498.html Regulatory Planning Process], which established a “regulatory planning process” with the purpose of helping to “ensure that each major step in the process of rule development is consistent with Administration policy.”  
  
According to OMB, the problem with regulatory review under Executive Order 12,291 was that such review “often came late in the regulatory process, after huge investments of agency time and resources, and often after agency staff commitments to constituents had made it extremely difficult to consider any legally acceptable, but previously ignored, regulatory alternative.” This resulted, OMB said, in the “bureaucracy often present[ing] agency heads with faits accompli.”  
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According to OMB, the problem with regulatory review under Executive Order 12291 was that such review “often came late in the regulatory process, after huge investments of agency time and resources, and often after agency staff commitments to constituents had made it extremely difficult to consider any legally acceptable, but previously ignored, regulatory alternative.” This resulted, OMB said, in the “bureaucracy often present[ing] agency heads with faits accompli.”  
  
Executive Order 12,498’s regulatory planning process was designed to avoid this problem. Under this procedure, the head of each agency was required to determine at the beginning of the regulatory process whether a proposed regulatory venture was “consistent with the goals of the Administration.” At the beginning of the year, Agency heads were to develop a plan for managing the agency’s most significant regulatory actions. OMB then reviewed the plan for consistency with the administration’s program and published the coordinated agency plans in a government-wide document. This document, entitled Regulatory Program of the United States Government, governed more than 20 major rulemaking agencies and was published each year during the second Reagan term and the Bush administration to inform Congress and the public of the government’s regulatory plans.
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Executive Order 12498’s regulatory planning process was designed to avoid this problem. Under this procedure, the head of each agency was required to determine at the beginning of the regulatory process whether a proposed regulatory venture was “consistent with the goals of the Administration.” At the beginning of the year, Agency heads were to develop a plan for managing the agency’s most significant regulatory actions. OMB then reviewed the plan for consistency with the administration’s program and published the coordinated agency plans in a government-wide document. This document, entitled “Regulatory Program of the United States Government,governed more than 20 major rulemaking agencies and was published each year during the second Reagan term and the Bush administration to inform Congress and the public of the government’s regulatory plans.
  
President Reagan, in 1987 and 1988, issued three additional executive orders, dealing with federalism, interference with property rights (which is still in effect), and the family. OMB was given a role in ensuring coordination of regulatory policy in these areas. President Bush basically continued the program of presidential review of agency rulemaking established by President Reagan, although due to Congressional opposition to OIRA actions, President Bush’s nominee to head OIRA was not confirmed. To counter this weakening of OIRA’s authority, President Bush created the Council on Competitiveness, headed by Vice President Quayle, and gave it authority to intervene in major agency rulemakings.  Several of the Council’s interventions provoked intense criticisms leading up to the 1992 elections.
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President Reagan, in 1987 and 1988, issued three additional executive orders, dealing with federalism, interference with property rights (which is still in effect), and the family. OMB was given a role in ensuring coordination of regulatory policy in these areas. President Bush basically continued the program of presidential review of agency rulemaking established by President Reagan, although due to congressional opposition to OIRA actions, President Bush’s nominee to head OIRA was not confirmed. To counter this weakening of OIRA’s authority, President Bush created the Council on Competitiveness, headed by Vice President Quayle, and gave it authority to intervene in major agency rulemakings.  Several of the Council’s interventions provoked intense criticisms leading up to the 1992 elections.
  
===The Clinton Executive Order—Executive Order 12,866===
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===The Clinton Executive Order—Executive Order 12866===
With the election of President Clinton, one of his first actions was an attempt to reestablish some bipartisan consensus on rulemaking review. His nominee as OIRA Administrator was the first subcabinet nominee to be appointed. Following the example of the Reagan Administration, President Clinton then set out to redraft the extant Executive Order, and produced Executive Order 12,866 on September 30, 1993. This Order, which remains operative, carries over many of the principles of E.O. 12,291 (and E.O. 12,498), which it superseded, but it also made some significant modifications that simplified the process, made it more selective, and introduced more transparency into the OMB/agency consultations. In drafting this Order, the Clinton Administration followed many of the suggestions of the Administrative Conference in its Recommendation 88-9, “Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking.
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With the election of President Clinton, one of his first actions was an attempt to reestablish some bipartisan consensus on rulemaking review. His nominee as OIRA Administrator was the first subcabinet nominee to be appointed. Following the example of the Reagan Administration, President Clinton then set out to redraft the extant Executive Order and produced Executive Order 12866, [https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf Regulatory Planning and Review], on September 30, 1993. This Executive Order, which remains operative, carries over many of the principles of Executive Order 12291 and Executive Order 12498 and made some significant modifications that simplified the process, made it more selective, and introduced more transparency into the OMB/agency consultations. In drafting this Executive Order, the Clinton Administration followed many of the suggestions in ACUS [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/88-9.pdf Recommendation 88-9].  
  
The Order begins with a lengthy “Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles,” which are quite similar to those in Executive Order 12,291 except that it takes pains to specify that measurement of costs and benefits should include both quantifiable and qualitative measures. As with previous Orders, Executive Order 12,866 retains the traditional (since 1978) level of $100 million annual effect on the economy for those major rules (now referred to as “economically significant” rules) that must be accompanied by cost-benefit assessments when forwarded to OIRA as proposed and final rules.
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The Executive Order begins with a lengthy “Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles,” which are quite similar to those in Executive Order 12291 except that it specifies that measurement of costs and benefits should include both quantifiable and qualitative measures. As with previous Orders, Executive Order 12866 retains the traditional (since 1978) level of $100 million annual effect on the economy for those major rules (now referred to as “economically significant” rules) that must be accompanied by cost-benefit assessments when forwarded to OIRA as proposed and final rules.
  
Executive Order 12,866 also retains the OIRA review process for other rules, although it only requires that “significant regulatory actions” be subject to review. This includes those $100 million rules plus others that have material adverse effects on “the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” It also includes rules that may materially alter the budgetary impact of benefit programs or the rights of recipients, that raise “novel legal or policy issues” or are inconsistent or interfere with actions taken by another agency. The process established for identifying such “significant regulatory actions” relies on agency identification of them in the first instance, vetted by OIRA. Rules that are not so identified may be issued without OIRA review. This selectivity streamlined the review process considerably, and made it possible to include, for the first time, a deadline (of 90 days, with one 30-day extension allowed) for completion of OIRA review. In the event of an unresolved dispute between OIRA and the agency, the Vice President is directed to make the decision (or recommend one to the President).
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Executive Order 12866 also retains the OIRA review process for other rules, although it only requires that “significant regulatory actions” be subject to review. This includes those $100 million rules plus others that have material adverse effects on “the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” It also includes rules that may materially alter the budgetary impact of benefit programs or the rights of recipients, that raise “novel legal or policy issues,” or are inconsistent or interfere with actions taken by another agency. The process established for identifying such “significant regulatory actions” relies on agency identification of them in the first instance, vetted by OIRA. Rules that are not so identified may be issued without OIRA review. This selectivity streamlined the review process considerably and made it possible to include, for the first time, a deadline (of 90 days, with one 30-day extension allowed) for completion of OIRA review. In the event of an unresolved dispute between OIRA and the agency, the Vice President is directed to make the decision (or recommend one to the President).
  
The review process set forth in the Order made significant improvements in transparency. Following an ACUS recommendation closely, the Order provides that after the agency has concluded its rulemaking it should make available to the public all submissions to OIRA, and identify all changes made in the rule, noting those made at the behest of OIRA. In addition, OIRA, for its part, must regularize the way it receives any outside communications concerning an agency rule that is subject to review. Only the Administrator or her designee may receive such communications. OIRA must forward any such communications to the agency within ten days, invite agency officials to any meetings held with outsiders, and maintain a public log of all such contacts. At the end of the proceeding OIRA must also make available all documents exchanged with the agency.
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The review process set forth in the Executive Order made significant improvements in transparency. Following an ACUS recommendation closely, it provides that after the agency has concluded its rulemaking it should make available to the public all submissions to OIRA and identify all changes made in the rule, noting those made at the behest of OIRA. In addition, OIRA, for its part, must regularize the way it receives any outside communications concerning an agency rule that is subject to review. Only the Administrator or her designee may receive such communications. OIRA must forward any such communications to the agency within ten days, invite agency officials to any meetings held with outsiders, and maintain a public log of all such contacts. At the end of the proceeding OIRA must also make available all documents exchanged with the agency.
  
In place of the Reagan E.O. 12,498 on regulatory planning, the Clinton Order establishes its own yearly planning mechanism. It continues the semiannual publication of the Unified Regulatory Agenda, which lists all proposed, pending and completed regulatory and deregulatory actions. And it requires that the October Agenda contain each agency’s annual Regulatory Plans, which must be approved personally by the agency head. These plans must be forwarded to OIRA (and then on to affected agencies, the Vice President and a group of named high-level White House Advisors) by June 1 of each year. The plans are supposed to also include agency determinations on which existing rules are to be reviewed and reconsidered during the ensuing year, and “preliminary estimates of the anticipated costs and benefits” of each rule planned for that calendar year. These actions do not represent any sharp break from the practices of previous administrations. However, Executive Order 12,866 is a departure in one regard—for the first time the independent regulatory agencies are specifically directed to comply with the planning and agenda provisions (though not with the rule-review process).
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In place of the Reagan Executive Order 12498 on regulatory planning, the Clinton Order establishes its own yearly planning mechanism. It continues the semiannual publication of the [https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain Unified Regulatory Agenda], which lists all proposed, pending, and completed regulatory and deregulatory actions. And it requires that the October Agenda contain each agency’s annual Regulatory Plans, which must be approved personally by the agency head. These plans must be forwarded to OIRA (and then on to affected agencies, the Vice President and a group of named high-level White House Advisors) by June 1 of each year. The plans are supposed to also include agency determinations on which existing rules are to be reviewed and reconsidered during the ensuing year and “preliminary estimates of the anticipated costs and benefits” of each rule planned for that calendar year. These actions do not represent any sharp break from the practices of previous administrations. However, Executive Order 12866 is a departure in one regard—for the first time the independent regulatory agencies are specifically directed to comply with the planning and agenda provisions (though not with the rule-review process).
  
The Clinton Executive Order was generally well received by most observers of the regulatory scene. Its basic approach has remained fundamentally unchanged since its issuance, and OIRA has worked out a stable and workable relationship with the agencies in administering it. The once rather vibrant legal and policy debate over the pros and cons of presidential review has gradually evolved into a fairly broad agreement that it is not only legal, but that if properly administered, it is essential to effective executive branch management. Nevertheless, there has been some serious criticism of OIRA’s failure to meet the deadlines set in the Order.  
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The Clinton Executive Order was generally well received by most observers of the regulatory scene. Its basic approach has remained fundamentally unchanged since its issuance, and OIRA has worked out a stable and workable relationship with the agencies in administering it. The once rather vibrant legal and policy debate over the pros and cons of presidential review has gradually evolved into a fairly broad agreement that it is legal and, if properly administered, is essential to effective executive branch management. Nevertheless, there has been some serious criticism of OIRA’s failure to meet the deadlines set in the Order.  
  
President Clinton also issued a presidential directive on plain language, and number of other executive orders that remain in effect, concerning: environmental justice in minority populations and low-income populations (E.O. 12,898), civil justice reform (E.O. 12,988), protection of children from environmental risks (E.O. 13,045), federalism (E.O. 13,132), and consultation with Indian Tribal Governments (E.O. 13,175).
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President Clinton also issued a [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1998-06-10/pdf/98-15700.pdf presidential directive on plain language] and number of other executive orders that remain in effect concerning: environmental justice in minority populations and low-income populations ([https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/nepapub/nepa_documents/RedDont/Req-EO12898envjustice.pdf Executive Order 12898]), civil justice reform ([https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1996-02-07/pdf/96-2755.pdf Executive Order 12988]), protection of children from environmental risks ([https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1997-04-23/pdf/97-10695.pdf Executive Order 13045]), federalism ([https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-08-10/pdf/99-20729.pdf Executive Order 13132]), and consultation with Indian Tribal Governments ([https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2000-11-09/pdf/00-29003.pdf Executive Order 13175]).
  
President Bush continued the use of Executive Order 12,866, although he did make several significant changes. In 2002, he made some small changes in Executive Order 13,258, basically removing the Vice President from the process. In January 2007, in Executive Order 13,422, he made more fundamental changes. Most significantly he added a requirement that “significant guidance documents” also be reviewed by OIRA in a way similar to significant regulatory actions. He also required that agencies identify in writing specific “market failures” that necessitate a rulemaking, that agency Regulatory Policy Officers be presidential appointees, that these officers must approve the Regulatory Plan, that aggregate costs and benefits for all rules must be included in the Regulatory Plan, and that agencies consider whether to use “formal” (“on the record”) rulemaking for “complex determinations”. However, as mentioned below, President Obama, upon assuming office, revoked the Bush changes and reinstated the original Clinton order. However, by later memorandum, the requirement that significant guidance documents be reviewed by OIRA was reinstated.
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President Bush continued the use of Executive Order 12866, although he did make several significant changes. In 2002, he made some small changes in Executive Order 13258, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2002-02-28/pdf/02-5069.pdf Amending Executive Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review], basically removing the Vice President from the process. In January 2007, in Executive Order 13422, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2007-01-23/pdf/07-293.pdf Further Amendment to Executive Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review], he made more fundamental changes. Most significantly he added a requirement that “significant guidance documents” also be reviewed by OIRA in a way similar to significant regulatory actions. He also required that agencies identify in writing specific “market failures” that necessitate a rulemaking, that agency Regulatory Policy Officers be presidential appointees, that these officers must approve the Regulatory Plan, that aggregate costs and benefits for all rules must be included in the Regulatory Plan, and that agencies consider whether to use “formal” (“on the record”) rulemaking for “complex determinations.However, as mentioned below, President Obama, upon assuming office, revoked the Bush changes and reinstated the original Clinton order. However, by later memorandum, the requirement that significant guidance documents be reviewed by OIRA was reinstated.
  
OIRA did issue a memorandum in September 2001, putting its own stamp on the E.O. 12,866 process. The memorandum describes the “general principles and procedures that will be applied by OMB in the implementation of E.O. 12,866 and related statutory and executive authority.”
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OIRA did issue a [https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/pubpress/2001-38-attach.pdf memorandum] in September 2001 putting its own stamp on the Executive Order 12866 process. The memorandum describes the “general principles and procedures that will be applied by OMB in the implementation of Executive Order 12866 and related statutory and executive authority.”
  
 
Significantly, during the Bush Administration, OIRA also announced several new initiatives in its review process. First, it made extensive use of its website to publish its guidelines and other information pertaining to its review process and specific rule reviews. This continues today.  Second, it began the practice of issuing public “return letters” that send rules back to the agency for reconsideration, “review letters” that comment on aspects of a particular rule review, and “prompt letters,” which are sent on OMB’s initiative and contain suggestions for new or stronger regulations. While these letters are still posted on [https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoReturnLetters reginfo.gov], the Obama and the Trump Administrations have made little use of this practice.  
 
Significantly, during the Bush Administration, OIRA also announced several new initiatives in its review process. First, it made extensive use of its website to publish its guidelines and other information pertaining to its review process and specific rule reviews. This continues today.  Second, it began the practice of issuing public “return letters” that send rules back to the agency for reconsideration, “review letters” that comment on aspects of a particular rule review, and “prompt letters,” which are sent on OMB’s initiative and contain suggestions for new or stronger regulations. While these letters are still posted on [https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoReturnLetters reginfo.gov], the Obama and the Trump Administrations have made little use of this practice.  
  
More importantly, during the Bush Administration, OMB also issued four far-reaching documents affecting the regulatory process that remain in effect today. In 2003 it issued a revised OMB Circular A-4,  which provides guidance on the development of regulatory analyses. OMB also issued a more far-reaching and controversial “Peer Review Bulletin” in December 2004, which requires administrative agencies to conduct a peer review on all “influential regulatory information that the agency intends to disseminate.”  Finally, in 2007, OMB issued an important new government-wide “Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices. It also (along with the Office of Science and Technology Policy) issued a set of “Updated Principles for Risk Analysis.In so doing it declined to finalize a Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin that the two agencies had issued in January 2006, in favor of updating the Clinton Administration’s Principles issued in 1995. Finally, President Bush issued two other executive orders concerning regulations that remain in effect today: (1) analysis of adverse effects on energy supply, distribution, or use (E.O. 13,211)  and (2) proper consideration of small entities in agency rulemaking (E.O. 13,272).  
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More importantly, during the Bush Administration, OMB issued four far-reaching documents affecting the regulatory process that remain in effect today. In 2003 it issued a revised [https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/memo_pmc_a4.pdf OMB Circular A-4],  which provides guidance on the development of regulatory analyses. OMB also issued a more far-reaching and controversial [https://www.cio.noaa.gov/services_programs/pdfs/OMB_Peer_Review_Bulletin_m05-03.pdf Peer Review Bulletin] in December 2004, which requires administrative agencies to conduct a peer review on all “influential regulatory information that the agency intends to disseminate.”  Finally, in 2007, OMB issued an important new government-wide [https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-01-25/pdf/E7-1066.pdf Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices.] It also (along with the [https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/ Office of Science and Technology Policy]) issued a set of [https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2007/m07-24.pdf Updated Principles for Risk Analysis]. In so doing it declined to finalize a Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin that the two agencies had issued in January 2006, in favor of updating the Clinton Administration’s Principles issued in 1995. Finally, President Bush issued two other executive orders concerning regulations that remain in effect today: (1) analysis of adverse effects on energy supply, distribution, or use ([https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2001-05-22/pdf/01-13116.pdf Executive Order 13211])  and (2) proper consideration of small entities in agency rulemaking ([https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2002-08-16/pdf/02-21056.pdf Executive Order 13272]).  
  
 
===Developments in the Obama Administration===
 
===Developments in the Obama Administration===
Shortly after taking office, President Obama revoked the Bush Amendments to Executive Order 12,866  and directed the Director of OMB, in consultation with regulatory agencies, to produce a set of recommendations for a new executive order on federal regulatory review within 100 days, followed by an unusual request for public comments on the same subject. Almost 200 public comments were received.   
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Shortly after taking office, President Obama revoked the Bush Amendments to Executive Order 12866 and directed the Director of OMB, in consultation with regulatory agencies, to produce a set of recommendations for a new executive order on federal regulatory review within 100 days, followed by an unusual request for public comments on the same subject. Almost 200 public comments were received.   
  
After about a year of internal consideration, the White House finally settled on its approach to OMB review—basically to reaffirm Executive Order 12,866. It did so on January 18, 2011, with Executive Order 13,563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.”37 In Section 1(b), the Order stated: “This order is supplemental to and reaffirms the principles, structures, and definitions governing contemporary regulatory review that were established in Executive Order 12866 . . . .”
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After about a year of internal consideration, the White House finally settled on its approach to OMB review—basically to reaffirm Executive Order 12866—with Executive Order 13563, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/2011-1385.pdf Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review] on January 18, 2011. In Section 1(b), the Order stated: “This order is supplemental to and reaffirms the principles, structures, and definitions governing contemporary regulatory review that were established in Executive Order 12866.”
  
 
It did contain a few new mandates and points of emphasis. Most notably, agencies were urged (as appropriate and within legal constraints) to (1) consider “values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts”; (2) “afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment through the Internet on any proposed regulation, with a comment period that should generally be at least 60 days”; (3) “provide, for both proposed and final rules, timely online access to the rulemaking docket on regulations.gov, including relevant scientific and technical findings, in an open format that can be easily searched and downloaded”; (4) for proposed rules, provide “an opportunity for public comment on all pertinent parts of the rulemaking docket, including relevant scientific and technical findings”; (5) seek public input from affected persons “[b]efore issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking”; (6) “identify and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice”; (7) “promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned”; and (8) “[w]ithin 120 days of the date of this order, . . . develop and submit to [OIRA] a preliminary plan” for periodically reviewing “its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so as to make the agency’s regulatory program more effective or less burdensome in achieving the regulatory objectives.”  
 
It did contain a few new mandates and points of emphasis. Most notably, agencies were urged (as appropriate and within legal constraints) to (1) consider “values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts”; (2) “afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment through the Internet on any proposed regulation, with a comment period that should generally be at least 60 days”; (3) “provide, for both proposed and final rules, timely online access to the rulemaking docket on regulations.gov, including relevant scientific and technical findings, in an open format that can be easily searched and downloaded”; (4) for proposed rules, provide “an opportunity for public comment on all pertinent parts of the rulemaking docket, including relevant scientific and technical findings”; (5) seek public input from affected persons “[b]efore issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking”; (6) “identify and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice”; (7) “promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned”; and (8) “[w]ithin 120 days of the date of this order, . . . develop and submit to [OIRA] a preliminary plan” for periodically reviewing “its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so as to make the agency’s regulatory program more effective or less burdensome in achieving the regulatory objectives.”  
  
The one action mandate in the new Executive Order was for agencies to develop plans for retrospective review of their existing regulations. On May 26, 2011, the OIRA Administrator announced the results of this effort. On July 11, 2011, President Obama issued a follow-up Executive Order extending the terms of E.O. 13,563 to independent regulatory agencies. On September 15, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,707, titled “Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People.”  Noting the value of insights from behavioral science to improve the “effectiveness and efficiency of Government.”
+
The one action mandate in the new Executive Order was for agencies to develop plans for retrospective review of their existing regulations. On May 26, 2011, the OIRA Administrator announced the results of this effort. On July 11, 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13579, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-07-14/pdf/2011-17953.pdf Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies], which extended the terms of Executive Order 13563 to independent regulatory agencies. On September 15, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13707, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-09-18/pdf/2015-23630.pdf Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People]. Noting the value of insights from behavioral science to improve the “effectiveness and efficiency of Government.”
 +
 
 +
===Developments in the Trump Administration===
 +
Shortly after taking office, President Trump issued Executive Order 13771, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,] which requires agencies to identify at least two regulations to be repealed for every proposed or promulgated regulation. The cost of each new regulation must be fully offset by the repeal specified above, and the agency must provide an approximation of the total costs or savings associated with each new regulation or repealed regulation. All regulations must be included in the ''Unified Agenda'', and during the federal budget process, the OMB Director must identify to agencies a total amount of incremental costs of regulations permitted for that fiscal year. The order directed the Director of OMB to provide agency heads with guidance addressing the processes for measuring regulatory costs, the costs of existing regulations, what qualifies as new and offsetting regulations, and situations that would require waivers of the order’s requirements. OIRA issued [https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf Guidance Implementing Executive Order 13771, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs”] to assist agencies in carrying out these requirements.
 +
 
 +
President Trump also issued Executive Order 13777, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda]. This order requires the head of each agency to designate an official as its Regulatory Reform Officer (RRO) who would implement initiatives and policies including Executive Order 13771, Executive Order 12866, and Section 6 of Executive Order 13563 regarding retrospective review. All agencies must also form a Regulatory Reform Task Force made up of the RRO, the Regulatory Policy Officer, a representative from the central policy office, and three senior agency officials if the agency is listed in 31 U.S.C. § [http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title31-section901&num=0&edition=prelim 901(b)(1)] (the executive departments, EPA, and NASA), which “shall evaluate existing regulations . . . and make recommendations to the agency head regarding their repeal, replacement, or modification.”  In making these determinations, the task forces should focus on regulations that (1) “eliminate jobs, or inhibit job creation;” (2) “are outdated, unnecessary, or ineffective;” (3) “impose costs that exceed benefits;” (4) “create serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with regulatory initiatives and policies;” (5) “are inconsistent with the requirements of section 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001, . . . in particular those regulations that rely in whole or in part on data, information, or methods that are not publicly available or that are insufficiently transparent to meet the standard for reproducibility; or” (6) “derive from or implement Executive Orders or other Presidential directives that have been subsequently rescinded or substantially modified.”  The Executive Order also requires agency heads to prioritize regulations that the Regulatory Reform Task Force identifies as outdated, unnecessary, or ineffective when implementing regulatory offsets under Executive Order 13771.
 +
 
 +
Finally, President Trump issued Executive Order 13783, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-03-31/pdf/2017-06576.pdf Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,] which directs agencies to review regulations that “potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources and appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind those that unduly burden the development of domestic energy resources.”  This order also revoked Executive Order 13653, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2013-11-06/pdf/2013-26785.pdf Preparing the United States for the Impact of Climate Change], and memoranda under the Obama Administration related to climate change.
 +
 
 +
===Developments in the Biden Administration===
 +
Within his first two months in office, President Biden rescinded several of President Trump’s executive orders related to the rulemaking process. In addition, President Biden issued a memorandum titled Modernizing Regulatory Review. This memorandum explicitly reaffirms Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563. Additionally, it directs the OMB Director to work with agencies to produce a set of recommendations that improves and modernizes regulatory review. The memorandum specifies that these recommendations should include concrete suggestions on how the regulatory review process can “promote public health and safety, economic growth, social welfare, racial justice, environmental stewardship, human dignity, equity, and the interests of future generations.” Furthermore, the memorandum specifies that the recommendations should, among other actions, include proposed reforms to Circular A-4 to promote these goals; suggest procedures that take into account distributional impacts in regulatory analyses; propose how OIRA can partner with agencies to “explore, promote, and undertake regulatory initiatives that are likely to yield significant benefits”; and determine an appropriate approach to the review of guidance documents.
  
 
==Bibliography==
 
==Bibliography==
 
===Congressional Documents===
 
===Congressional Documents===
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
*Oversight Hearing on “Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation?” House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Committee of the Judiciary (Feb 13, 2007).
+
*[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg33312/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg33312.pdf Amending Executive Order 12866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation?], Hearing Before Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007).
*Regulatory Reform, Hearing before the House Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, 108th Cong. (Nov. 17, 2004) (statement of John D. Graham, Administrator of OIRA), http:// www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/testimony/graham/111704_graham_ reg_reform.html.
+
*[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg86439/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg86439.pdf How to Improve Regulatory Accounting: Costs, Benefits and Impacts of Federal Regulations], Hearing Before Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Nat. Res. and Regulatory Affairs, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of John D. Graham, Administrator of OIRA).
*H.R. REP. NO. 115-119 (2017). OIRA INSIGHT, REFORM, AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-115hrpt19/pdf/CRPT-115hrpt19-pt1.pdf
+
*OIRA Insight, Reform, and Accountability Act, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CRPT-115hrpt19/pdf/CRPT-115hrpt19-pt1.pdf H.R. Rep. No. 115-19] (2017).
 +
 
 +
*[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg20632/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg20632.pdf Assessing the Obama Years: OIRA and Regulatory Impacts on Jobs, Wages and Economic Recovery], Hearing Before Subcomm. On Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) ([https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/assessing-obama-years-oira-regulatory-impacts-jobs-wages-economic-recovery/ video]).
  
*Assessing the Obama Years: OIRA and Regulatory Impacts on Jobs, Wages and Economic Recovery, Subcomm. On Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg20632/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg20632.pdf  
+
*[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg26026/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg26026.pdf Challenges Facing OIRA in Ensuring Transparency and Effective Rulemaking], Hearing Before Subcomm. on Health Care, Benefits and Admin. Rules & Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (2015) ([https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/challenges-facing-oira-ensuring-transparency-effective-rulemaking/ video]).
https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/assessing-obama-years-oira-regulatory-impacts-jobs-wages-economic-recovery/
+
*[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg82203/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg82203.pdf Reducing Red Tape: The New OIRA Administrator’s Perspective], Hearing Before H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. (2013).
*Challenges Facing OIRA in Ensuring Transparency and Effective Rulemaking, Subcomm. On Health Care, Benefits and Administrative Rules & Subcomm. On Government Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 114th Cong. (2015). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg26026/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg26026.pdf https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/challenges-facing-oira-ensuring-transparency-effective-rulemaking/
 
*Reducing Red Tape: The New OIRA Administrator’s Perspective, H. Comm. on Small Business, 113th Cong. (2013). https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg82203/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg82203.pdf
 
  
 
</div>
 
</div>
  
===Government Documents===
+
===OMB/OIRA Documents===
 
+
====Reports to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations====
====OMB Reports to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations====
 
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
*Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (Sept. 30, 1997), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_rcongress/. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,352 (July 22, 1997).
+
*Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (Sept. 30, 1997). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 62 Fed. Reg. 39352 (July 22, 1997).
*Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (January 1999), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport1998.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,034 (Aug. 17, 1998), extended 63 Fed. Reg. 49,935 (Sept. 18, 1998).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/costbenefitreport1998.pdf Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations] (January 1999). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 63 Fed. Reg. 44034 (Aug. 17, 1998), extended 63 Fed. Reg. 49935 (Sept. 18, 1998).
*Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (June 2000), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/ inforeg/2000fedreg-report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 65 Fed. Reg. 1296 (Jan. 7, 2000); extended 65 Fed. Reg. 4447 (Jan. 27, 2000) and 65 Fed. Reg. 7198 (Feb. 7, 2000).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2000fedreg-charts.pdf Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations] (June 2000). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 65 Fed. Reg. 1296 (Jan. 7, 2000); extended 65 Fed. Reg. 4447 (Jan. 27, 2000) and 65 Fed. Reg. 7198 (Feb. 7, 2000).
*Making Sense of Regulation, 2001 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (December 2001), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 66 Fed. Reg. 22,041 (May 2, 2001); extended 66 Fed. Reg. 34,963 (July 2, 2001).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf Making Sense of Regulation: 2001 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (December 2001). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 66 Fed. Reg. 22041 (May 2, 2001); extended 66 Fed. Reg. 34963 (July 2, 2001).
*Stimulating Smarter Regulation, 2002 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (December 2002), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2002_report_to_congress.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014 (Mar. 28, 2002).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2002_report_to_congress.pdf Stimulating Smarter Regulation: 2002 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (December 2002). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 67 Fed. Reg. 15014 (Mar. 28, 2002).
*Informing Regulatory Decisions, 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (September 2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2003_cost-ben_final_rpt.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,772 (Apr. 1, 2003).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2003_cost-ben_final_rpt.pdf Informing Regulatory Decisions: 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (September 2003). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 68 Fed. Reg. 15772 (Apr. 1, 2003).
*Progress in Regulatory Reform, 2004 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (December 2004), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2004_cb_final.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 69 Fed. Reg. 7987 (Feb. 20, 2004).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2004_cb_final.pdf Progress in Regulatory Reform: 2004 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (December 2004). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 69 Fed. Reg. 7987 (Feb. 20, 2004).
*Validating Regulatory Analysis, 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (December 2005), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ default/files/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 70 Fed. Reg. 14,735 (Mar. 23, 2005).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2005_cb/final_2005_cb_report.pdf Validating Regulatory Analysis: 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (December 2005). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 70 Fed. Reg. 14735 (Mar. 23, 2005).
*2006 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (January 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/inforeg/2006_cb/ 2006_cb_final_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,213 (Apr. 13, 2006).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2006_cb/2006_cb_final_report.pdf 2006 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (January 2007). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 71 Fed. Reg. 19213 (Apr. 13, 2006).
*2007 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (June 2008) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/ 2007_cb/2007_cb_final_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,061 (Mar. 12, 2007).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2007_cb/2007_cb_final_report.pdf 2007 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (June 2008). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 72 Fed. Reg. 11061 (Mar. 12, 2007).
*2008 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (January 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ information_and_regulatory_affairs/2008_cb_final.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169 (Sept. 24, 2008).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/information_and_regulatory_affairs/2008_cb_final.pdf 2008 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (January 2009). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 73 Fed. Reg. 55169 (Sept. 24, 2008).
*2009 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ legislative_reports/2009_final_BC_Report_01272010.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,101 (Sept. 21, 2009).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/2009_final_BC_Report_01272010.pdf 2009 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (Jan. 27, 2010). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 48101 (Sept. 21, 2009).
*2010 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (July 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/reports/ 2010_Benefit_Cost_Report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 75 Fed. Reg. 22,630 (Apr. 29, 2010).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/legislative/reports/2010_Benefit_Cost_Report.pdf 2010 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (July 2010). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 75 Fed. Reg. 22630 (Apr. 29, 2010).
*2011 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (June 2011) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/ 2011_cba_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 18,260 (Apr. 1, 2011).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_report.pdf 2011 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (June 2011). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 18260 (Apr. 1, 2011).
*2012 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (April 2013) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2012_cb/ 2012_cost_benefit_report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,003 (Apr. 12, 2012).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/2012_cb/2012_cost_benefit_report.pdf 2012 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (April 2013). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 22003 (Apr. 12, 2012).
*2013 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (May 2014) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2013_cb/ 2013_cost_benefit_report-updated.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,780 (May. 21, 2013).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/2013_cb/2013_cost_benefit_report-updated.pdf 2013 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (May 2014). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 78 Fed. Reg. 29780 (May. 21, 2013).
*2014 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities (June 15, 2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/ 2014_cb/2014-cost-benefit-report.pdf. Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,776 (July 2, 2014).  
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/2014_cb/2014-cost-benefit-report.pdf 2014 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (June 15, 2015). Notice of availability of draft report and request for comments, 72 Fed. Reg. 37776 (July 2, 2014).
*2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT (Mar. 10, 2016).  
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/2015_cb/2015-cost-benefit-report.pdf 2015 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities] (Mar. 10, 2016).
*2016 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT (Dec. 23, 2016).
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/draft_2016_cost_benefit_report_12_14_2016_2.pdf 2016 Draft Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Agency Compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act] (Dec. 23, 2016).
*2017 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT (Feb. 23, 2018).  
+
*[https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf 2017 Draft Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Agency Compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act] (Feb. 23, 2018).
 
</div>
 
</div>
  
 
====Other OMB Documents====
 
====Other OMB Documents====
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
*Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Program of the United States Government (1987-1988) (and through 1990-91).
+
*''Regulatory Program of the United States Government'' (1987-1988) (and through 1990-91).
*Office of Management and Budget, Report on Executive Order No. 12,866, 59 Fed. Reg. 24,293 (1994).
+
*''Report on Executive Order No. 12866'', 59 Fed. Reg. 24276 (May 10, 1994).
*Office of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, More Benefits Fewer Burdens—Creating a Regulatory System that Works For the American People, A Report to the President on the Third Anniversary of Executive Order 12,866 (1996), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ OMB/inforeg/3_year_report.html.
+
*''More Benefits Fewer Burdens—Creating a Regulatory System that Works For the American People'', A Report to the President on the Third Anniversary of Executive Order 12866 (1996).
 
</div>
 
</div>
  
====Administrative Conference Documents====
+
===ACUS Documents===
 +
====Recommendations====
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
*Recommendation 88-9, Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking
+
*88-9 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/88-9.pdf Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking]
*Recommendation 93-4, Improving the Environment for Agency Rulemaking
+
*93-4 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/93-4.pdf Improving the Environment for Agency Rulemaking]
*Recommendation 95-3, Review of Existing Agency Regulations
+
*95-3 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/95-3.pdf Review of Existing Agency Regulations]
*Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation
+
*2011-6 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Recommendation-2011-6-International-Regulatory-Cooperation.pdf International Regulatory Cooperation]
*Recommendation 2012-5, Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities
+
*2012-5 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Final-Recommendation-2012-5-Improving-Agency-Coordination.pdf Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities]
*Recommendation 2013-2, Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent Regulatory Agencies
+
*2013-2 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation%202013-2%20%28Benefit-Cost%20Analysis%29_0.pdf Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent Regulatory Agencies]
*Recommendation 2014-5, Retrospective Review of Agency Rules  
+
*2014-5 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation%25202014-5%2520%2528Retrospective%2520Review%2529_1.pdf Retrospective Review of Agency Rules]
*Recommendation 2015-1, Promoting Accuracy and Transparency in the Unified Agenda
+
*2015-1 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Unified%20Agenda%20Recommendation%20FINAL_0.pdf Promoting Accuracy and Transparency in the Unified Agenda]
*Recommendation 2017-3, Plain Language in Regulatory Drafting
+
*2017-3 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation%202017-3%20%28Plain%20Language%20in%20Regulatory%20Drafting%29.pdf Plain Language in Regulatory Drafting]
*Recommendation 2017-6, Learning from Regulatory Experience
+
*2017-6 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation%202017-6%20%28Learning%20from%20Regulatory%20Experience%29_0.pdf Learning from Regulatory Experience]
*Recommendation 2018-1, Paperwork Reduction Act Efficiencies
+
*2018-1 [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/recommendation-2018-1-paperwork-reduction-act-efficiencies_1.pdf Paperwork Reduction Act Efficiencies]
*Statement #18, Improving the Timeliness of OIRA Regulatory Review, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013)
 
NOTE FOR CHRISTINA/TORI UPDATE ALL ACUS REPORT CITATIONS AND REORDER BELOW BY AUTHOR'S LAST NAME
 
*background report by Joseph E. Aldy, Learning from Experience: An Assessment of the Retrospective Reviews of Agency Rules and the Evidence for Improving the Design and Implementation of Regulatory Policy, available at http://www.acus.gov/report/retrospective-review-report).
 
*Curtis W. Copeland, Length of Rule Reviews by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, available at www.acus.gov/ report/oira-review-report)
 
*Curtis W. Copeland, Economic Analysis and Independent Regulatory Agencies, available at www.acus.gov/report/economic-analysis-final-report).
 
*Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities, available at www.acus.gov/report/consultants-report-improving-coordination-relatedagency-responsibilities
 
*Sidney Shapiro at Reports and Recommendations of the Admin. Conf. of the U.S., 1994-1995 at 407
 
*Michael McCarthy, International Regulatory Cooperation, 20 Years Later: Updating ACUS Recommendation 91-1, available at www.acus.gov/report/international-regulatory-cooperation-final-report).
 
*2018-1 Report
 
*2017-6 Report
 
*2017-3 Report
 
*background report by Curtis W. Copeland, Promoting Accuracy and Transparency in the Unified Agenda, available at www.acus.gov/report/final-unified-agenda-report).
 
 
</div>
 
</div>
 
+
===CRS Documents===
====CRS Documents====
 
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
*Maeve P. Carey, Cong. Research Serv., The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview, RL32240 (June 17, 2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ misc/RL32240.pdf.
+
*Maeve P. Carey, RL32240, ''The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview'' (June 17, 2013).
*Maeve P. Carey, Cong. Research Serv., Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process, R41974 (Dec. 9, 2014), http:// digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc501649/m1/1/high_res_d/R41974_ 2014Dec09.pdf.
+
*Maeve P. Carey, R41974, ''Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process'' (Dec. 9, 2014).
*Vivian S. Chu & Daniel T. Shedd, Cong. Research Serv., Presidential Review of Independent Regulatory Commission Rulemaking: Legal Issues, R42720 (Sept. 10, 2012), http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/ metadc227809/m1/1/high_res_d/R42720_2012Sep10.pdf.
+
*Vivian S. Chu & Daniel T. Shedd, R42720, ''Presidential Review of Independent Regulatory Commission Rulemaking: Legal Issues'' (Sept. 10, 2012).
*Vivian S. Chu & Daniel T. Shedd, Cong. Research Serv., Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation, RS20846 (Apr. 6, 2014), http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc287968/m1/1/high_res_d/ RS20846_2014Apr16.pdf.
+
*Vivian S. Chu & Daniel T. Shedd, RS20846, ''Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation'' (Apr. 6, 2014).
*Curtis Copeland, Cong. Research Serv., Changes to the OMB Regulatory Review Process by Executive Order 13422, RL33862 (Jan. 3, 2008), https://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/RL33862.pdf.
+
*Curtis Copeland, RL33862, ''Changes to the OMB Regulatory Review Process by Executive Order 13422'' (Jan. 3, 2008).
*Curtis Copeland, Cong. Research Serv., Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, RL32397 (June 9, 2009), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32397.pdf.
+
*Curtis Copeland, RL32397, ''Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs'' (June 9, 2009).
 
</div>
 
</div>
  
====GAO Documents====
+
===GAO Documents===
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
*Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Be Useful in Assessing Environmental Regulations, Despite Limitations (GAO/RCED84-62) (Apr. 6, 1984).
+
*GAO/RCED84-62, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/141408.pdf Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Be Useful in Assessing Environmental Regulations, Despite Limitations] (1984).
*Federalism: Implementation of Executive Order 12612 in the Rulemaking Process (T-GGD-99-93) (May 5, 1999).
+
*T-GGD-99-93, [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-T-GGD-99-93/pdf/GAOREPORTS-T-GGD-99-93.pdf Federalism: Implementation of Executive Order 12612 in the Rulemaking Process] (1999).
*Federalism: Previous Initiatives Have Had Little Effect on Agency Rulemaking (GAO/T-GGD-99-31) (June 30, 1999).
+
*GAO/T-GGD-99-131, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/108000.pdf Federalism: Previous Initiatives Have Had Little Effect on Agency Rulemaking] (1999).
*Regulatory Accounting—Analysis of OMB’s Reports on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation (GAO/ GGD-99-59) (April 1999).
+
*GAO/ GGD-99-59, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/156562.pdf Regulatory Accounting: Analysis of OMB’s Reports on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation] (1999).
*Regulatory Burden: Recent Studies, Industry Issues, and Agency Initiatives (GAO/GGD-94-28) (Dec. 13, 1993).
+
*GAO/GGD-94-28, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/218925.pdf Regulatory Burden: Recent Studies, Industry Issues, and Agency Initiatives] (1993).
*Regulatory Burden: Measurement Challenges Raised by Selected Companies (GAO/GGD-97-2) (Nov. 18, 1996).
+
*GAO/GGD-97-2, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155661.pdf Regulatory Burden: Measurement Challenges and Concerns Raised by Selected Companies] (1996).
*Regulatory Reform: Agencies Could Improve Development, Documentation and Clarity of Regulatory Economic Analysis (GAO/RCED-98-142) (May 26, 1998).
+
*GAO/RCED-98-142, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/156173.pdf Regulatory Reform: Agencies Could Improve Development, Documentation, and Clarity of Regulatory Economic Analysis] (1998).
*Regulatory Reform: Changes Made to Agencies’ Rules Are Not Always Clearly Documented (GAO/GGD-98-31) (January 1998).
+
*GAO/GGD-98-31, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/225071.pdf Regulatory Reform: Changes Made to Agencies’ Rules Are Not Always Clearly Documented] (1998).
*Regulatory Reform: Information on Costs, Cost-Effectiveness, and Mandated Deadlines for Regulations (GAO/ PEMD-95-18BR) (Mar. 8, 1995).
+
*GAO/ PEMD-95-18BR, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/80/78970.pdf Regulatory Reform: Information on Costs, Cost-Effectiveness, and Mandated Deadlines for Regulations] (1995).
*Regulatory Takings: Implementation of Executive Order on Government Actions Affecting Private Property Use (GAO-03-1015) (September 2003).
+
*GAO-03-1015, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/239832.pdf Regulatory Takings: Implementation of Executive Order on Government Actions Affecting Private Property Use] (2003).
*Rulemaking: OMB’s Role in Reviews of Agencies’ Draft Rules and the Transparency of Those Reviews (GAO03-929) (September 2003).
+
*GAO-03-929, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157476.pdf Rulemaking: OMB’s Role in Reviews of Agencies’ Draft Rules and the Transparency of Those Reviews] (2003).
*Environmental Justice: EPA Should Devote More Attention to Environmental Justice When Developing Clean Air Rules (GAO-05-289) (July 25, 2005).
+
*GAO-05-289, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247171.pdf Environmental Justice: EPA Should Devote More Attention to Environmental Justice When Developing Clean Air Rules] (2005).
*Improvements Needed to Monitoring and Evaluation of Rules Development as Well as to the Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews GAO-09-205 (Apr. 20, 2009).
+
*GAO-09-205, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/290/288538.pdf Federal Rulemaking: Improvements Needed to Monitoring and Evaluation of Rules Development as Well as to the Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews] (2009).
*International Regulatory Cooperation: Agency Efforts Could Benefit from Increased Collaboration and Interagency Guidance (GAO-13-588) (August 2013).
+
*GAO-13-588, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656488.pdf International Regulatory Cooperation: Agency Efforts Could Benefit from Increased Collaboration and Interagency Guidance] (2013).
*Regulatory Review Processes Could Be Enhanced (GAO-14-423T) (Mar. 11, 2014).
+
*GAO-14-423T, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661540.pdf Federal Rulemaking: Regulatory Review Processes Could Be Enhanced] (2014).
*Reexamining Regulations: Agencies Often Made Regulatory Changes, but Could Strengthen Linkages to Performance Goals (GAO-14-268) (April 2014).
+
*GAO-14-268, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662517.pdf Reexamining Regulations: Agencies Often Made Regulatory Changes, but Could Strengthen Linkages to Performance Goals] (2014).
*Environmental Regulation: EPA Should Improve Adherence to Guidance for Selected Elements of Regulatory Impact Analyses (GAO-14-519) (July 2014).
+
*GAO-14-519, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664872.pdf Environmental Regulation: EPA Should Improve Adherence to Guidance for Selected Elements of Regulatory Impact Analyses] (2014).
*Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Included Key Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis, but Explanations of Regulations’ Significance Could Be More Transparent (GAO-14-714) (September 2014).
+
*GAO-14-714, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665745.pdf Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Included Key Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis, but Explanations of Regulations’ Significance Could Be More Transparent] (2014).
*Regulatory Guidance Processes: Selected Departments Could Strengthen Internal Control and Dissemination Practices (GAO-15-368) (April 2015).
+
*GAO-15-368, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669688.pdf Regulatory Guidance Processes: Selected Departments Could Strengthen Internal Control and Dissemination Practices] (2015).
*GAO-15-718, FEDERAL USER FEES: KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATORY FEES (2015).
+
*GAO-15-718, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672572.pdf Federal User Fees: Key Considerations for Designing and Implementing Regulatory Fees] (2015).
*GAO-16-720, REGULATORY GUIDANCE PROCESSES: TREASURY AND OMB NEED TO REEVALUATE LONG-STANDING EXEMPTIONS OF TAX REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE (2016).
+
*GAO-16-720, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679518.pdf Regulatory Guidance Processes: Treasury and OMB Need to Reevaluate Long-standing Exemptions of Tax Regulations and Guidance] (2016).
*GAO-18-22, FEDERAL REGULATIONS: KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AGENCY DESIGN AND ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS (2017).
+
*GAO-18-22, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687875.pdf Federal Regulations: Key Considerations for Agency Design and Enforcement Decisions] (2017).
*GAO-18-183, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: OMB SHOULD WORK WITH AGENCIES TO IMPROVE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT COMPLIANCE DURING AND AT THE END OF PRESIDENTS’ TERMS (2018).  
+
*GAO-18-183, [https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690624.pdf Federal Rulemaking: OMB Should Work with Agencies to Improve Congressional Review Act Compliance During and at the End of Presidents’ Terms] (2018).
 
</div>
 
</div>
  
====Other Government Documents====
+
===Other Government Documents===
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
*Office of Legal Counsel, Op. on Additional Procedures Concerning OIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498.
+
*Office of Legal Counsel, ''Op. on Additional Procedures Concerning OIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498''.
*Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 59 (Feb. 13, 1981), 1981 WL 30877. Also available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/DJMemoReaganEO12291PDF.pdf.
+
*Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum from Larry L. Simms, Acting Assistant Attorney General, [https://www.justice.gov/file/22586/download Proposed Executive Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,”] 5 Op. O.L.C. 59 (1981).
*Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Justice Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act (Dec. 10, 1997), http:// www3.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/policy/ej_guidance_nepa_ ceq1297.pdf.
+
*Council on Envtl. Quality, [https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/ej_guidance_nepa_ceq1297.pdf Environmental Justice Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act] (Dec. 10, 1997).
*Environmental Protection Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970-1992—Draft Report for Congress (April 1997).
+
*Envtl. Protection Agency, [https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/contsetc.pdf The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, 1970-1990]—Draft Report for Congress (April 1997).
*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dep't of Commerce, [https://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=200118 Tenth Annual Report on Federal Agency Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and Conformity Assessment] (2007).
+
*Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, [https://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=200118 Tenth Annual Report on Federal Agency Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and Conformity Assessment] (2007).
*Office of the Vice President, Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less, Improving Regulatory Systems, National Performance Review (1993).
+
*Office of the Vice President, ''Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less, Improving Regulatory Systems'', National Performance Review (1993).
 +
*Statement #18, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OIRA%20Statement%20FINAL%20POSTED%2012-9-13.pdf Improving the Timeliness of OIRA Regulatory Review], 78 Fed. Reg. 76275 (Dec. 17, 2013).
 
</div>
 
</div>
+
 
 
===Selected Books and Articles===
 
===Selected Books and Articles===
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
 
<div style="column-count:2;-moz-column-count:2;-webkit-column-count:2">
*Administrative Law Review, OIRA Thirtieth Anniversary Conference, 63 Admin. Law Rev. (special ed. 2011).
+
*''OIRA Thirtieth Anniversary Conference'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. (special ed.) (2011).
*A.B.A. Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice, Report: Improving the Administrative Process: A Report to the President-Elect of the United States (2016), 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 205 (2017).  
+
*ABA Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice, [https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law/Final%20POTUS%20Report%2010-26-16.authcheckdam.pdf Report: Improving the Administrative Process: A Report to the President-Elect of the United] (2016), 69 Admin. L. Rev. 205 (2017).
*Rebecca Adams, Regulating the Rule-Makers: John Graham at OIRA, CQ Weekly 520 (Feb. 23, 2002).
+
*Rebecca Adams, ''Regulating the Rule-Makers: John Graham at OIRA'', CQ Weekly 520 (Feb. 23, 2002).
*Robert A. Anthony, Executive Order, OMB Bulletin Focus on Guidances, 32 Admin. L. & Reg. News 10 (Spring 2007).
+
*Joseph E. Aldy, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Aldy%2520Retro%2520Review%2520Draft%252011-17-2014.pdf Learning from Experience: An Assessment of the Retrospective Reviews of Agency Rules and the Evidence for Improving the Design and Implementation of Regulatory Policy] (Nov. 17, 2014) (report to ACUS).
*William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence Over Rulemaking, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 611 (2002).
+
*Robert A. Anthony, ''Executive Order, OMB Bulletin Focus on Guidances'', 32 Admin. L. & Reg. News 10, Spring 2007.
*Donald R. Arbuckle, Obscure But Powerful: Who Are Those Guys?, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 131 (2011).
+
*William D. Araiza, ''Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence Over Rulemaking'', 54 Admin. L. Rev. 611 (2002).
*Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260 (2006).
+
*Donald R. Arbuckle, ''Obscure But Powerful: Who Are Those Guys?'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 131 (special ed.) (2011).
*Stephen J. Balla, Jennifer M. Deets, & Forrest Maltzman, Outside Communications and OIRA Review of Agency Regulations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 149 (2011).
+
*Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, ''Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State'', 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260 (2006).
*Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 Yale L.J. 1732 (2014).
+
*Stephen J. Balla, Jennifer M. Deets, & Forrest Maltzman, ''Outside Communications and OIRA Review of Agency Regulations'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 149 (special ed.) (2011).
*Josh Blackman, Presidential Maladministration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 397 (2016).
+
*Rachel Bayefsky, Note, [https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1732.Bayefsky.1782_u52fptmb.pdf Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis], 123 Yale L.J. 1732 (2014).
*James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 Duke L. J. 851 (2001).
+
*Josh Blackman, [https://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Blackman.pdf Presidential Maladministration], 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 397 (2018).
*Alexander Bolton, Rachel Augustine Potter, & Sharece Thrower, Organizational Capacity, Regulatory Review, and the Limits of Political Control, 32 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 242 (2016).  
+
*James F. Blumstein, ''Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues'', 51 Duke L. J. 851 (2001).
*Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47 (2006).
+
*Alexander Bolton, Rachel Augustine Potter, & Sharece Thrower, ''Organizational Capacity, Regulatory Review, and the Limits of Political Control'', 32 J. L. Econ. & Org. 242 (2016).
*Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Legitimacy, Selectivity, and the Disunitary Executive: A Reply to Sally Katzen, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1511 (2007).
+
*Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, [https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1490&context=mlr Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control], 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47 (2006).
*Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533 (1989).
+
*Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, [https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1445&context=mlr Legitimacy, Selectivity, and the Disunitary Executive: A Reply to Sally Katzen], 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1511 (2007).
*Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and Rulemaking Petitions, 67 Admin. L. Rev. 265 (2015).
+
*Harold H. Bruff, ''Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking'', 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533 (1989).
*Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 347 (2017).  
+
*Reeve T. Bull, ''Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and Rulemaking Petitions'', 67 Admin. L. Rev. 265 (2015).
*John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882 (2015).
+
*Ming H. Chen, ''Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law'', 69 Admin. L. Rev. 347 (2017).
*Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 Yale J. on Reg. Online 57 (2013).
+
*John C. Coates IV, [https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/a.882.Coates.1011_owe353wf.pdf Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications], 124 Yale L.J. 882 (2015).
*Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 43 (2017).  
+
*Cary Coglianese, [http://yalejreg.com/moving-forward-with-regulatory-lookback/ Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback], 30 Yale J. on Reg. Online 57 (2013).
*Cary Coglianese, Improving Regulatory Analysis at Independent Agencies, 67 AM. U.L. REV. 733 (2018).
+
*Cary Coglianese, ''The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State'', 69 Admin. L. Rev. 43 (2017).
*Daniel Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 55 (2012).
+
*Cary Coglianese, [http://www.aulawreview.org/au_law_review/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/02-Coglianese_67AMULREV733.pdf Improving Regulatory Analysis at Independent Agencies], 67 Am. U. L. Rev. 733 (2018).
*John Conyers, Jr., Henry C. Johnson, Jr., & David N. Cicilline, The Dangers of Legislating Based on Mythology: The Serious Risks Presented by the Anti-Regulatory Agenda of the 115th Congress and the Trump Administration, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 365 (2017).
+
*Daniel Cole, [https://www.law.ua.edu/pubs/lrarticles/Volume%2064/Issue%201/2%20Cole%2055%20-%2089.pdf Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis], 64 Ala. L. Rev. 55 (2012).
*Curtis Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1257 (2006).
+
*John Conyers, Jr., Henry C. Johnson, Jr., & David N. Cicilline, [http://harvardjol.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HLL201-1.pdf The Dangers of Legislating Based on Mythology: The Serious Risks Presented by the Anti-Regulatory Agenda of the 115th Congress and the Trump Administration], 54 Harv. J. on Legis. 365 (2017).
*Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration’s Use and Abuse of Rulemaking. Part I: The Rise of OIRA, 28 Admin. & Reg. L. News 8 (Summer 2003).
+
*Curtis W. Copeland, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copeland%20Final%20BCA%20Report%204-30-13.pdf Economic Analysis and Independent Regulatory Agencies] (Apr. 30, 2013) (report to ACUS).
*Stephen Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821 (2003).
+
*Curtis W. Copeland, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copeland%20Report%20CIRCULATED%20to%20Committees%20on%2010-21-13.pdf Length of Rule Reviews by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs] (Oct. 7, 2013) (report to ACUS).
*Nestor M. Davidson &. Ethan J. Lieb, Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond, 103 Geo. L.J. 259 (2015).
+
*Curtis Copeland, [https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2208&context=ulj The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking], 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1257 (2006).
*Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075 (1986).
+
*Curtis W. Copeland, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Unified%20Agenda%20Draft%20Report%20041315%20FINAL_0.pdf The Unified Agenda: Proposals for Reform] (Apr. 13, 2015) (report to ACUS).
*Christopher DeMuth, OIRA at Thirty, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 15 (2011).
+
*Robin Kundis Craig, ''The Bush Administration’s Use and Abuse of Rulemaking. Part I: The Rise of OIRA'', 28 Admin. & Reg. L. News 8 (Summer 2003).
*Caroline DeWitt, Comment, The Council on Competitiveness: Undermining the Administrative Procedure Act with Regulatory Review, 6 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 759 (1993).
+
*Stephen Croley, ''White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation'', 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821 (2003).
*Susan E. Dudley, Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 113 (2011).
+
*Nestor M. Davidson &. Ethan J. Lieb, [https://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/64/regleprudence/pdf Regleprudence—At OIRA and Beyond], 103 Geo. L.J. 259 (2015).
*Susan E. Dudley, Improving Regulatory Accountability: Lessons From the Past and Prospects for the Future, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1027 (2015).
+
*Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, ''White House Review of Agency Rulemaking'', 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075 (1986).
*E. Donald Elliott, TQM’ing OMB: Or Why Executive Review Under Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167 (1994).
+
*Christopher DeMuth, ''OIRA at Thirty'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 15 (special ed.) (2011).
*Jaclyn L. Falk, Comment, The Behind Closed Door Policy: Executive Influence in the Environmental Protection Agency’s Informal Rulemaking, 47 U.S.F. L. Rev. 593 (2013).
+
*Caroline DeWitt, Comment, ''The Council on Competitiveness: Undermining the Administrative Procedure Act with Regulatory Review'', 6 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 759 (1993).
*Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 227 (1998).
+
*Susan E. Dudley, ''Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 113 (special ed.) (2011).
*Scott Farrow, Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Executive Office Oversight Matter?, AEI Publication (Dec. 2001), http://www. researchgate.net/publication/46454272_Improving_ Regulatory_Performance_ Does_Executive_Office_Oversight_Matter.
+
*Susan E. Dudley, [https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=caselrev Improving Regulatory Accountability: Lessons From the Past and Prospects for the Future], 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1027 (2015).
*Arthur Fraas, Observations on OIRA’s Policies and Procedures, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 79 (2011).
+
*E. Donald Elliott, [https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4231&context=lcp TQM’ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It], 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167 (1994).
*Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent Regulatory Commissions, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 213 (2011).
+
*Blake Emerson & Cheryl Blake, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Plain%20Regulatory%20Drafting_Final%20Report.pdf Plain Language in Regulatory Drafting] (Dec. 8, 2017) (report to ACUS).
*William Funk “Agency Oversight by the Political Branches,” Chapter 11 in Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, A Guide to Judicial and Political Review of Federal Agencies 259-304 (2d ed. Michael E. Herz, Richard Murphy & Kathryn Watts eds., 2015).
+
*Jaclyn L. Falk, Comment, [https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/usfblogs.usfca.edu/dist/7/272/files/2014/09/The-Behind-Closed-Door-Policy-Executive-Influence-in-the-Environmental-Protection-Agencys-Informal-Rulemaking.pdf The Behind Closed Door Policy: Executive Influence in the Environmental Protection Agency’s Informal Rulemaking], 47 U.S.F. L. Rev. 593 (2013).
*Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Disclosing the Impact, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 299 (1991).
+
*Cynthia R. Farina, ''Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism'', 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 227 (1998).
*John D. Graham & Cory R. Liu, Regulatory and Quasi-Regulatory Activity Without OMB and Cost-Benefit Review, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 425 (2014).
+
*Scott Farrow, ''Improving Regulatory Performance: Does Executive Office Oversight Matter?'' (2001).
*John D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 Fordham Urb. L. J. 953 (2006).
+
*Arthur Fraas, ''Observations on OIRA’s Policies and Procedures'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. (special ed.) 79 (2011).
*Wendy L. Gramm, Regulatory Review Issues, October 1985–February 1988, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 27 (2011).
+
*Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, ''On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent Regulatory Commissions'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 213 (special ed.) (2011).
*Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123 (1994).
+
*Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Freeman-Rossi-ACUS-Report-5-30-12-PDF.pdf Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsibilities] (May 30, 2012) (report to ACUS).
*Robert W. Greene, Improving U.S. Financial Regulation Through OIRA Review & Robust Regulatory Analysis Standards, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (2016).  
+
*William Funk “Agency Oversight by the Political Branches,” ch. 11 in Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, ''A Guide to Judicial and Political Review of Federal Agencies'' 259-304 (2d ed. Michael E. Herz, Richard Murphy & Kathryn Watts eds., 2015).
*Sarah Grimmer, Note, Public Controversy Over Peer Review, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 275 (2005).
+
*Margaret Gilhooley, [https://journals.iupui.edu/index.php/inlawrev/article/view/2956/2879 Executive Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Disclosing the Impact], 25 Ind. L. Rev. 299 (1991).
*Hiba Hafiz, Economic Analysis of Labor Regulation, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1115 (2017).  
+
*John D. Graham & Cory R. Liu, [http://harvardjlpp.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/37_2_425_Graham_Liu-1.pdf Regulatory and Quasi-Regulatory Activity Without OMB and Cost-Benefit Review], 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 425 (2014).
*Robert W. Hahn, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results From Regulation, (New York: Oxford University Press and AEI Press, 1996).
+
*John D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, [https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2198&context=ulj Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration], 33 Fordham Urb. L. J. 953 (2006).
*Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 233 (1991).
+
*Wendy L. Gramm, ''Regulatory Review Issues, October 1985–February 1988'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 27 (special ed.) (2011).
*Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1097 (2006).
+
*Abner S. Greene, ''Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking'', 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123 (1994).
*Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 325 (2014).
+
*Robert W. Greene, [https://rutgerspolicyjournal.org/sites/jlpp/files/Greene.pdf Improving U.S. Financial Regulation Through OIRA Review & Robust Regulatory Analysis Standards], 14 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 89 (2016).
*Thomas D. Hopkins, The Evolution of OIRA Oversight—CWPS to OIRA, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 71 (2011).
+
*Sarah Grimmer, Note, ''Public Controversy Over Peer Review'', 57 Admin. L. Rev. 275 (2005).
*Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001).
+
*Zachary J. Gubler, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ZGubler%20ACUS%20Final%20Report%2811-17%29.pdf Regulatory Experimentation] (Nov. 17, 2017) (report to ACUS).
*Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on “Inside the Administrative State,” 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1497 (2007).
+
*Hiba Hafiz, [http://wisconsinlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Hafiz-Final.pdf Economic Analysis of Labor Regulation], 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 1115 (2017).
*Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 103 (2011).
+
*Robert W. Hahn, Risks, ''Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results From Regulation'', (Oxford Univ. Press & AEI Press, 1996).
*Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy (4th ed. CQ Press 2011).
+
*Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, [https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1177&context=yjreg The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis], 8 Yale J. on Reg. 233 (1991).
*Peter Ketcham-Colwill, Presidential Influence Over AgencyRulemaking Through Regulatory Review, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1622 (Oct. 2014).
+
*Lisa Heinzerling, [https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2202&context=ulj Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA], 33 Fordham Urb. L. J. 1097 (2006).
*Robert E. Litan & William D. Nordhaus, Reforming Federal Regulation (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1983).
+
*Lisa Heinzerling, [https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1741&context=pelr Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House], 31 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 325 (2014).
*Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609 (2014).
+
*Thomas D. Hopkins, ''The Evolution of OIRA Oversight—CWPS to OIRA'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 71 (special ed.) (2011).
*Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 Geo. L.J. 1337 (2013)
+
*Elena Kagan, ''Presidential Administration'', 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001).
*Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking, (5th ed.) (American Bar Association) (2012).
+
*Sally Katzen, [https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1444&context=mlr A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on “Inside the Administrative State,”] 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1497 (2007).
*Jeffrey S. Lubbers, OMB to Require Peer Review for Regulatory Science Documents, 29 Admin. L. & Reg. News 3 (Fall 2003).
+
*Sally Katzen, ''OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 103 (special ed.) (2011).
*Maureen Mahon, Note, Proceed With Caution: The Implications of the OMB Peer Review Guidelines on Precautionary Legislation, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 461 (2006).
+
*Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, ''Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy'' (CQ Press, 4th ed. 2011).
*Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87 (2016).  
+
*Peter Ketcham-Colwill, [https://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/82-Geo.-Wash.-L.-Rev.-1622.pdf Presidential Influence Over Agency Rulemaking Through Regulatory Review], 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1622 (2014).
*Randolph J. May, OMB’s Peer Review Proposal—Swamped by Science? 29 Admin. & Reg. L. News 4 (Spring 2004).
+
*Robert E. Litan & William D. Nordhaus, ''Reforming Federal Regulation'' (Yale Univ. Press, 1983).
*Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443 (1987).
+
*Michael A. Livermore, [http://uchicagolawjournalsmshaytiubv.devcloud.acquia-sites.com/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/Livermore_Art.pdf Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence], 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609 (2014).
*Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L.J. 1671 (2012).
+
*Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, [https://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/119/regulatory-review-capture-agency/pdf Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction], 101 Geo. L.J. 1337 (2013)
*Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush II Administration, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 179 (2011).
+
*Jeffrey S. Lubbers, ''A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking'' (ABA Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice, 5th ed. 2012).
*Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 Duke L.J. 1763 (2012).
+
*Jeffrey S. Lubbers, ''OMB to Require Peer Review for Regulatory Science Documents'', 29 Admin. L. & Reg. News 3, Fall 2003.
*Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127 (2010).
+
*Maureen Mahon, Note, [https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1179&context=law_lawreview Proceed With Caution: The Implications of the OMB Peer Review Guidelines on Precautionary Legislation], 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 461 (2006).
*Nina Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2455 (2011).
+
*Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, [https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4712&context=clr Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty], 102 Cornell L. Rev. 87 (2016).
*Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 447 (2014).
+
*Randolph J. May, ''OMB’s Peer Review Proposal—Swamped by Science?'', 29 Admin. & Reg. L. News 4, Spring 2004.
*Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239 (2017).
+
*Michael McCarthy, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/International-Reg-Cooperation-Report.pdf International Regulatory Cooperation, 20 Years Later: Updating ACUS Recommendation 91-1] (Oct. 19, 2011) (report to ACUS).
*James C. Miller III, The Early Days of Reagan Regulatory Relief and Suggestions for OIRA’s Future, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 93 (2011).
+
*Thomas O. McGarity, ''Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking'', 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443 (1987).
*Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1986).
+
*Thomas O. McGarity, [https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1538&context=dlj Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age], 61 Duke L.J. 1671 (2012).
*William A. Niskanen, Clinton Regulation Will Be “Rational”: Interview with Sally Katzen, the New OIRA Administrator, Regulation Magazine No. 3, at 36 (1993), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1993/7/v16n3-4.pdf.
+
*Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, ''Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of Regulatory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush II Administration'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 179 (special ed.) (2011).
*Lars Noah, Peer Review and Regulatory Reform, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,606 (2000).
+
*Emily Hammond Meazell, [https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1539&context=dlj Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma], 61 Duke L.J. 1763 (2012).
*Paul Noe, Analyzing the Destruction of Human Capital by Regulations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 203 (2011).
+
*Nina A. Mendelson, [https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1208&context=articles Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making], 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127 (2010).
*Note, Regulatory Analyses and Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 91 Yale L. J. 739 (1982).
+
*Nina Mendelson, [http://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/pdfs/Vol_79/Mendelson_May.pdf Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority over Agency Action], 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2455 (2011).
*Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 994 (2011).
+
*Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, [http://harvardjlpp.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/37_2_447_Mendelson_Wiener.pdf Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA], 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 447 (2014).
*Note, The Inflation Impact Statement Program: An Assessment of the First Two Years, 26 Am. U. L. Rev. 1138 (1977).
+
*Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, [https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1664&context=mlr Internal Administrative Law], 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1239 (2017).
*Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1755 (2013).
+
*James C. Miller III, ''The Early Days of Reagan Regulatory Relief and Suggestions for OIRA’s Future'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 93 (special ed.) (2011).
*Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2016).  
+
*Alan B. Morrison, ''OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation'', 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1986).
*Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev. 889 (2008).
+
*William A. Niskanen, ''Clinton Regulation Will Be “Rational”: Interview with Sally Katzen, the New OIRA Administrator'', Regulation Magazine No. 3, at 36 (1993).
*Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 Va. J. Nat. Resources 1, 75-77 (1984).
+
*Lars Noah, ''Peer Review and Regulatory Reform'', 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,606 (2000).
*Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016).  
+
*Paul Noe, ''Analyzing the Destruction of Human Capital by Regulations'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 203 (special ed.) (2011).
*Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L. J. 963 (2001).
+
*Note, ''Regulatory Analyses and Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking'', 91 Yale L. J. 739 (1982).
*Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2487 (2011).
+
*Note, [https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol124_%20OIRA%20_avoidance.pdf OIRA Avoidance], 124 Harv. L. Rev. 994 (2011).
*Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Budget: The Regulatory Budget Debate, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 249 (2016).
+
*Note, ''The Inflation Impact Statement Program: An Assessment of the First Two Years'', 26 Am. U. L. Rev. 1138 (1977).
*Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 124 Yale L.J. Forum 246 (2015).
+
*Jennifer Nou, [https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_nou.pdf Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review], 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1755 (2013).
*Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan L. Rev. 1189 (1986).
+
*Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, [https://southerncalifornialawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/89_733.pdf Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure], 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 733 (2016).
*Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State: The Case of Financial Services Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 545 (2017).  
+
*Anne Joseph O’Connell, [http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/889.pdf Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State], 94 Va. L. Rev. 889 (2008).
*Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 1423 (2014).
+
*Erik D. Olson, ''The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291'', 4 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 1 (1984).
*Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health (Oxford University Press 2008).
+
*Eloise Pasachoff, [https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/a.2182.Pasachoff.2290_aqo1aub4.pdf The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control], 125 Yale L.J. 2182 (2016).
*Delissa Ridgway et al., The Council on Competitiveness and Regulatory Review: A “Kinder, Gentler” Approach to Regulation?, 6 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 691 (1993).
+
*Robert V. Percival, [https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=dlj Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive], 51 Duke L. J. 963 (2001).
*David B. Rivkin, The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch Rulemaking, 7 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 309 (1993).
+
*Robert V. Percival, [http://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/pdfs/Vol_79/Percival_May.pdf Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority Over Agency Regulatory Decisions?], 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2487 (2011).
*Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 193 (1981).
+
*Richard J. Pierce, Jr., [http://www.nyujlpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Pierce-Regulatory-Budget-Debate-19nyujlpp249.pdf The Regulatory Budget Debate], 19 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 249 (2016).
*Arden Rowell, Time in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 4 UC Irvine L. Rev. 1215 (2014).
+
*Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, [https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Posner-WeylPDF_ijby4z9e.pdf Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms], 124 Yale L.J. Forum 246 (2015).
*Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 335 (2011).
+
*Robert L. Rabin, ''Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective'', 38 Stan L. Rev. 1189 (1986).
*Andrew Rudalevige, Old Laws, New Meanings: Obama’s Brand of Presidential “Imperialism”, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2016).  
+
*Richard L. Revesz, [http://yalejreg.com/articlepdfs/34-JREG-545.pdf Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State: The Case of Financial Services Regulation], 34 Yale J. On Reg. 545 (2017).
*J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
+
*Richard L. Revesz, [http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/02-Revesz.pdf Quantifying Regulatory Benefits], 102 Cal. L. Rev. 1423 (2014).
*Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
+
*Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, ''Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health'' (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
*Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161 (1995).
+
*Delissa Ridgway et al., ''The Council on Competitiveness and Regulatory Review: A “Kinder, Gentler” Approach to Regulation?'', 6 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 691 (1993).
*David R. Sheaffer, The Price of Regulation: Rethinking Executive Review of Agency Rulemaking, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1091 (2016).  
+
*David B. Rivkin, ''The Unitary Executive and Presidential Control of Executive Branch Rulemaking'', 7 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 309 (1993).
*Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,064 (2004).
+
*Morton Rosenberg, ''Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291'', 80 Mich. L. Rev. 193 (1981).
*Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Revised Peer Review Bulletin, 29 Admin. L. & Reg. News 10 (Summer 2004).
+
*Arden Rowell, [https://www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/vol4/no4/Rowell.pdf Time in Cost-Benefit Analysis], 4 UC Irvine L. Rev. 1215 (2014).
*Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Constraining White House Political Control of Agency Rulemaking Through the Duty of Reasoned Explanation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1457 (2015).
+
*Susan Rose-Ackerman, [https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1153&context=umlr Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review], 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 335 (2011).
*Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 577 (2011).
+
*Andrew Rudalevige, [http://lawreview.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/G-Rudalevige-For-Website.pdf Old Laws, New Meanings: Obama’s Brand of Presidential “Imperialism”], 66 Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (2016).
*Stuart Shapiro, OIRA Inside and Out, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 135 (2011).
+
*J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, [https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1170&context=law_lawreview In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review], 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
*Stuart Shapiro & Deanna Moran, The Checkered History of Regulatory Reform Since the APA, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2016).  
+
*Thomas O. Sargentich, [http://www.administrativelawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/The-Emphasis-on-the-Presidency-in-U.S.-Public-Law-An-Essay-Critiquing-Presidential-Administration.pdf The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration], 59 Admin. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
*Stuart Shapiro & Debra Borie-Holtz, The Politics of Regulatory Reform (Routledge 2013).
+
*Peter M. Shane, ''Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking'', 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161 (1995).
*Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696 (2007).
+
*David R. Sheaffer, [https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1178&context=lr The Price of Regulation: Rethinking Executive Review of Agency Rulemaking], 2016 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1091 (2016).
*Peter L. Strauss, The President and the Constitution, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1151 (2015).
+
*Sidney Shapiro, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/gov.acus_.1995.rec_.95-3.pdf Agency Review of Existing Regulations] (Jan. 15, 1995) (report to ACUS).
*Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 181 (1986).
+
*Sidney A. Shapiro, ''OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures'', 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,064 (2004).
*Cass R. Sunstein, Simpler: The Future of Government (Simon & Schuster, 2013).
+
*Sidney A. Shapiro, ''OMB’s Revised Peer Review Bulletin'', 29 Admin. L. & Reg. News 10 (Summer 2004).
*Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838 (2013).
+
*Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, [https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/48/4/Articles/48-4_Shapiro-Murphy.pdf Constraining White House Political Control of Agency Rulemaking Through the Duty of Reasoned Explanation], 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1457 (2015).
*Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 579 (2014).
+
*Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, [https://repository.law.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1160&context=umlr The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out], 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 577 (2011).
*Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 Admin. L. Rev. (Special Ed.) 37 (2011).
+
*Stuart Shapiro, ''OIRA Inside and Out'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 135 (special ed.) (2011).
*Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943 (1980).
+
*Stuart Shapiro & Deanna Moran, [http://www.nyujlpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Shapiro-Moran-Regulatory-Reform-Since-the-APA-19nyujlpp141.pdf The Checkered History of Regulatory Reform Since the APA], 19 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 141 (2016).
*Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2017).
+
*Stuart Shapiro & Debra Borie-Holtz, ''The Politics of Regulatory Reform'' (Routledge 2013).
*Adam L. Warber, Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislating from the Oval Office (Lynne Reiner Publishers 2006).
+
*Stuart Shapiro, [https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/paperwork-reduction-act-efficiencies-final-report.pdf Paperwork Reduction Act Efficiencies] (May 14, 2018) (report to ACUS).
*Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2016).
+
*Peter L. Strauss, ''Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law'', 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696 (2007).
*Christopher E. Wilson, Comment: Not Good Enough for Government Work: How OMB’s Good Guidance Practices May Unintentionally Complicate Administrative Law, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 177 (2007).
+
*Peter L. Strauss, [https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=caselrev The President and the Constitution], 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1151 (2015).
 +
*Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, ''The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking'', 38 Admin. L. Rev. 181 (1986).
 +
*Cass R. Sunstein, Simpler: ''The Future of Government'' (Simon & Schuster, 2013).
 +
*Cass R. Sunstein, [https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_sunstein.pdf The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities], 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838 (2013).
 +
*Cass R. Sunstein, [http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2014/08/SUNSTEINDYSFUNCTION.pdf The Regulatory Lookback], 94 B.U. L. Rev. 579 (2014).
 +
*Jim Tozzi, ''OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding'', 63 Admin. L. Rev. 37 (special ed.) (2011).
 +
*Paul R. Verkuil, ''Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House'', 80 Colum. L. Rev. 943 (1980).
 +
*Christopher J. Walker, ''Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act'', 69 Admin. L. Rev. 629 (2017).
 +
*Adam L. Warber, ''Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislating from the Oval Office'' (Lynne Reiner Publishers 2006).
 +
*Kathryn A. Watts, [https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1240&context=mlr Controlling Presidential Control], 114 Mich. L. Rev. 683 (2016).
 +
*Christopher E. Wilson, [http://www.administrativelawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Not-Good-Enough-for-Government-Work-How-OMBs-Good-Guidance-Practices-May-Unintentionally-Complicate-Administrative-Law.pdf Comment: Not Good Enough for Government Work: How OMB’s Good Guidance Practices May Unintentionally Complicate Administrative Law], 59 Admin. L. Rev. 177 (2007).
 
</div>
 
</div>
  
 
===Miscellaneous===
 
===Miscellaneous===
*National Academy of Public Administration, Presidential Management of Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies (1987).
+
 
*Center for Regulatory Effectiveness at http://www.thecre.com/ ombpapers/centralrev.html.  
+
*National Academy of Public Administration, ''Presidential Management of Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies'' (1987).
*Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ten Thousand Commands at https://cei.org/10KC.
+
*[http://www.thecre.com/ombpapers/featuredarticles.html Center for Regulatory Effectiveness].
 +
*Competitive Enterprise Institute, [https://cei.org/10KC Ten Thousand Commands].

Latest revision as of 10:14, 26 May 2022

This section discusses the most significant presidential Executive Orders, Bulletins, and Memoranda, which pertain to the rulemaking process or federal regulation. Other executive orders and memoranda may be found in other sections, e.g., those relating to the Federal Advisory Committee Act.

Lead Agency:

Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

Executive Orders

Table of Executive Order Requirements

Executive Order (EO) Date and Administration of Issue Action Items Does the EO Contain a Statement Regarding Applicability to Independent Agencies?
EO 12630 - Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights 1988 - Reagan General Principles. Each agency “shall be guided by” the principles set forth in the EO when “formulating or implementing policies that have takings implications.”


Safety. These principles include the point that “the mere assertion of a . . . safety purpose is insufficient to avoid a taking.”  They should be undertaken only for “real and substantial threats,” be designed to significantly advance safety, “and be no greater than is necessary.”

Criteria. To the extent permitted by law, agencies are required to comply with a set of criteria before undertaking covered actions that include an assessment identifying the risk, establishing that safety is substantially advanced and that restrictions are not disproportionate to the overall risk, and estimating the cost to the government if the action is found to be a taking. In the event of an emergency, the analysis can be done later.


Policies That Have Takings Implications. These include proposed and final rules that if implemented “could effect a taking” (e.g., licenses, permits, or other conditions or limitations on private property use).


Ensuring Compliance. OMB and the Department of Justice are responsible for ensuring compliance with the EO.

No
EO 12866 - Regulatory Planning and Review 1993 - Clinton See 12866 table See 12866 table
EO 12889 - Implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 1993 - Clinton Notice. Agencies subject to the APA must provide at least a 75-day comment period for “any proposed Federal technical regulation or any Federal sanitary or phytosanitary measure of general application.”


Exceptions

  1. NAFTA Implementation. Regulations ensuring that the NAFTA Implementation Act is appropriately implemented on the date NAFTA enters into force (pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §3314(a)).
  2. Perishable Goods. Technical regulations relating to perishable goods.
  3. Urgent Safety or Protection Rules. Technical regulations addressing an “urgent problem” relating to safety or to protection of human, animal, or plant life or health; the environment; or consumers.
  4. Urgent Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection. Regulations addressing an “urgent problem” relating to sanitary or phytosanitary protection.

Definitions

  1. Technical Regulations. These are defined in the Trade Agreements Act at 19 U.S.C. §2576 b(7).
  2. Sanitary or Phytosanitary Measures. These are defined at 19 U.S.C. §2575 b(7).
No
EO 12898 - Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations 1994 - Clinton Strategies. Each agency is required to develop a strategy that “identifies and addresses disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations” and identify, among other things, rules that should be revised to meet the objectives of the Order.


Conduct. Each agency must ensure that its programs, policies, and activities that “substantially affect human health or the environment” do not exclude persons (including populations) from participating in or getting the benefits of, or subject them to discrimination under, such programs, policies, and activities.


Documents and Hearings. An agency’s public documents, notices, and hearings relating to human health and the environment must be “concise, understandable, and readily accessible.”

Yes. See § 6–604 for relevant text: "Independent agencies are requested to comply with the provisions of this order."
EO 12988 - Civil Justice Reform 1996- Clinton Within budgetary constraints and executive branch coordination requirements, agencies must review existing and new regulations to ensure they comply with specific requirements (e.g., “eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity” and “provide a clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard”) to improve regulatory drafting in order to reduce needless litigation. In conducting the reviews, agencies must “make every reasonable effort” to ensure that the rule meets specific objectives (e.g., specifies in clear language the preemptive or retroactive effect, if any). Agencies must determine that the rule meets the applicable standards or that it is unreasonable to meet one or more of those standards. Yes. See § 6 for relevant text: "The term 'agency' shall be defined as that term is defined in section 105 of title 5, United States Code."
EO 13045 - Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks 1997 - Clinton Policy. With respect to its rules, “to the extent permitted by law and appropriate, and consistent with the agency’s mission,” each agency must “address disproportionate risks to children that result from environmental health risks or safety risks.”

Analysis. For any substantive rulemaking action that “is likely to result in” an economically significant rule that concerns “an environmental health risk or safety risk that an agency has reason to believe may disproportionately affect children,” the agency must provide OMB/OIRA:

  1. Evaluation: “an evaluation of the environmental health or safety effects [attributable to products or substances that the child is likely to come in contact with or ingest] of the planned regulation on children.”
  2. Alternatives: “an explanation of why the planned regulation is preferable to other potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives considered by the agency.”
Yes. See § 1–102 for relevant text: "Each independent regulatory agency is encouraged to participate in the implementatoin of this order and comply with its provisions."
EO 13132 - Federalism 1999 - Clinton See 13132 table   See 13132 table  
EO 13175 - Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments 2000 - Clinton See 13175 table See 13175 table
EO 13211 - Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use 2001 - Bush Statement of Energy Effects. Agencies are required to prepare and submit to OIRA a Statement of Energy Effects for significant energy actions, to the extent permitted by law.


Significant Energy Action. A “significant energy action” is one that is “significant” under EO 12866 and is likely to have a significant adverse energy effect. Additionally, actions designated by the OIRA Administrator as “significant energy actions” are significant energy actions.


Contents of Statement. Agencies must provide a detailed statement of “any adverse effects on energy supply, distribution, or use (including a shortfall in supply, price increases, and increased use of foreign supplies)” for the action and reasonable alternatives and their effects.  


Publication. Agencies must publish the Statement or a summary in the related NPRM and final rule.

Yes. See § 4(b)(2) for relevant text: "'Agency' means any authority of the United States . . . other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies . . . ."
EO 13272 - Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking 2002 - Bush Advocacy Review. Agencies must “notify” Advocacy of draft rules that may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities when the draft rule is submitted to OIRA under EO 12866 or, if submission to OIRA is not required, “at a reasonable time prior to publication of the rule.” Advocacy is authorized to submit comments on the draft rule.


Consideration of Advocacy Comments. Agencies must give “every appropriate consideration” to any Advocacy comments on a draft rule. If consistent with legal requirements, agencies must include in final rule preambles their response to any written Advocacy comments on the proposed rule, unless the agency head certifies that the public interest is not served by such action.


Agency Procedures. Agencies must issue written procedures ensuring that the potential impact of their draft rules on small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and small organizations are “properly considered.”

Yes. See § 4 for relevant text: "Terms defined in section 601 of title 5 . . . including the term 'agency,' shall have the same meaning in this order."
EO 13563 - Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review 2011 - Obama General Principles. This EO supplements and reaffirms EO 12866, stressing that, to the extent permitted by law, each agency must ensure that the benefits of its rulemaking actions justify their costs, tailor their regulations to impose the least burden, consider cumulative burdens, maximize net benefits, use performance objectives, and assess available alternatives.


Public Participation. Agencies must provide a “meaningful opportunity” for public comment (generally 60 days) through the internet, with “timely” and easy access to all “pertinent” documents. Prior to issuing NPRMs, agencies should seek “the views of those likely to be affected,” when “feasible and appropriate.”


Integration and Innovation. Each agency must promote “coordination, simplification, and harmonization” across agencies to reduce redundant, inconsistent, or overlapping rules. Agencies must also seek to achieve goals “designed to promote innovation.”


Flexible Approaches. Agencies must consider “approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice.”


Objectivity with regard to scientific information. Agencies must “ensure the objectivity of any scientific and technological information and processes” supporting their rulemaking.


Retrospective Analysis. Agencies must consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules. They must have a plan to “periodically review” their existing significant regulations to make them “more effective or less burdensome.”

Yes. See § 7(a) for relevant text: "For purposes of this order, 'agency' shall have the meaning set forth in section 3(b) of [EO] 12866."
EO 13579 - Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies 2011 - Obama Independent regulatory agencies should promote EO 13563's goal of protecting “public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation,” and should comply with the provisions of EO 13563. Independent regulatory agencies should conduct retrospective analyses of rules to determine if they are “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome.” Each independent agency should publish their analyses online when possible, and should develop a plan within 120 days of the EO's issuance to periodically review its regulations to determine if any should be “modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed.” Yes. The EO is entirely geared toward independent agencies.
EO 13609 - Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation 2012 - Obama Every agency must include in its Regulatory Plan under EO 12866 (if required to submit one) a summary of international regulatory cooperation activities. All agencies must also ensure that regulations with international impacts are designated as such in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (Unified Agenda), on regulations.gov, and on reginfo.gov. Additionally, agencies must consider reforming significant regulations that create “unnecessary differences” between U.S. and international regulatory systems. Agencies are also required to consider any regulatory approaches abroad that the U.S. has agreed to consider under a regulatory cooperation council work plan. Yes. See § 4(a): "'Agency' means any authority of the United States that is an 'agency' . . . other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5)"; and § 5: "Independent reegulatory agencies are encouraged to comply with the provisions of this order" for relevant text.
EO 13610 - Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens 2012 - Obama Agencies are instructed to institutionalize regular reviews of their preivously issued significant regulations, and take additional steps to increase public participation in retrospective review of regulations. Agencies shall regularly (on the second Monday of January and July of each year) report on the status of their retrospective review efforts to OIRA. Reports should contain: progress on review, anticipated accomplishments, and proposed timelines. Agencies must make available to the public the final reports within three weeks from the date of submission of the draft report to OIRA. Yes. See § 5(b) for relevant text: "'[A]gency means any authority of the United States that is an 'agency' . . . other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5)."
EO 13725 - Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy 2016 - Obama Agencies must identify specific actions they can take to address “undue burdens” on competition, via pro-competitive rulemaking and regulations. Semiannual reports to the National Economic Council on actions meant to promote greater competition are also required.   Yes. See § 3(b) for relevant text: "Independent agencies are strongly encouraged to comply with the requirements of this order."
EO 13772 - Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System 2017 - Trump Federal regulation of the United States financial system is governed by seven core principles: 1) increasing informed consumer choice; 2) avoiding “taxpayer-funded bailouts”; 3) performing more rigorous regulatory impact analysis that addresses systemic risk and market failures, such as moral hazard and information asymmetry; 4) enabling American competitiveness in domestic and foreign markets; 5) promoting American interests in international financial regulatory negotiations; 6) making regulation efficient and appropriately tailored; and 7) restoring public accountability within federal financial regulatory agencies. The Secretary of the Treasury must consult with the heads of the member agencies of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, and must report to the President periodically on the extent to which the federal financial system's regulatory framework promotes the Core Principles, and what actions have been taken, and are currently underway, to promote the Core Principles. No
EO 13783 - Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth 2017 - Trump All agencies are required to immediately review all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and other agency actions that “potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources,” especially oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy. Agency actions mandated by law, necessary for the public interest, or are otherwise consistent with this order's policy statement (promoting clean and safe development of American energy resources while preserving federalism between the states and the federal government on regulatory issues) are exempt. Any agency action identified in this review must begin “as soon as practicable” to be wound down in compliance with APA procedures and EO 13771. Agencies should no longer base their cost-benefit analyses on previously-issued Technical Support Documents and Technical Updates of the Social Cost of Carbon issued from February 2010 through August 2016. No

Other White House Bulletins and Memoranda

Overview

History of Presidential Oversight of Rulemaking and Regulation

Presidential oversight of regulation is not a recent innovation. It has been in effect, in one form or another, since 1971, and it accompanied a major expansion in the scope and complexity of federal regulation that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s when a number of important social and environmental regulatory statutes were enacted.

In June 1971, President Nixon established a “Quality of Life Review” program, under which all “significant” draft proposed and final rules were submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which circulated them to other agencies for comment. Agencies were required to submit a summary of their proposals, a description of the alternatives that had been considered, and a cost comparison of alternatives. In practice, this program applied to rules pertaining to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational health and safety.

In 1974, President Ford issued an executive order requiring executive branch agencies to prepare an “inflation impact statement” for each “major” federal action. The order empowered the Director of OMB to administer the program, with authority to delegate functions to other agencies, including the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS). Under the Inflation Impact Statement program, agencies were required to prepare an inflation impact statement (IIS) for “major” rules prior to publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), and then to forward a summary of the IIS to COWPS upon publication of the NPRM. COWPS would review the IIS and, in its discretion, offer informal criticism of the proposal or participate in the public proceedings on the rule.

President Carter continued presidential review of agency rules by means of Executive Order 12044, Improving Government Regulations, issued in 1978. Under the order, executive agencies were required to: (1) publish semi-annual agendas, describing and giving the legal bases for, any “significant” regulations under development by the agency; (2) establish procedures to identify “significant” rules, to evaluate their need, and to have the agency head assure that the “least burdensome of the acceptable alternatives” was proposed; and (3) prepare a “regulatory analysis” that examined the cost-effectiveness of alternative regulatory approaches for “major rules.”

President Carter also established a Regulatory Analysis Review Group to review the regulatory analyses prepared for a limited number of proposed “major” rules and to submit comments on the proposed rules during the public comment period. He created another rulemaking review body, the Regulatory Council, which was charged with coordinating agency rulemaking to avoid duplication of effort or conflicting policy in regulation of any area. These efforts to coordinate agency rulemaking were challenged unsuccessfully in several lawsuits.

President Reagan acted quickly after taking office to increase control over executive branch rulemaking. On February 17, 1981, the President issued an executive order on federal regulations designed “to reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations.” The new Executive Order 12291, Federal Regulation, replaced Executive Order 12044, which President Reagan said had “proven ineffective.”

Executive Order 12291 contained both substantive requirements and procedural steps to be followed in the development and promulgation of new rules. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in OMB was given responsibility for implementing Executive Order 12291. OMB’s rulemaking review function is supplemented by the powers it was given in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, by which Congress statutorily established OIRA to, among other things, review and approve or disapprove agency “information collection requests.”

The Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice issued an opinion supporting the validity of Executive Order 12291. The opinion stated that the President’s authority to issue the order was based on his constitutional power to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” While concluding that any inquiry into Congressional intent in enacting specific rulemaking statutes “will usually support the legality of presidential supervision of rulemaking by Executive Branch agencies,” the opinion stated that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking “is more readily justified when it does not purport wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion which Congress had allocated to a particular subordinate official.”

Despite criticism of this new form of presidential review, President Reagan began his second term by expanding the program through Executive Order 12498, Regulatory Planning Process, which established a “regulatory planning process” with the purpose of helping to “ensure that each major step in the process of rule development is consistent with Administration policy.”

According to OMB, the problem with regulatory review under Executive Order 12291 was that such review “often came late in the regulatory process, after huge investments of agency time and resources, and often after agency staff commitments to constituents had made it extremely difficult to consider any legally acceptable, but previously ignored, regulatory alternative.” This resulted, OMB said, in the “bureaucracy often present[ing] agency heads with faits accompli.”

Executive Order 12498’s regulatory planning process was designed to avoid this problem. Under this procedure, the head of each agency was required to determine at the beginning of the regulatory process whether a proposed regulatory venture was “consistent with the goals of the Administration.” At the beginning of the year, Agency heads were to develop a plan for managing the agency’s most significant regulatory actions. OMB then reviewed the plan for consistency with the administration’s program and published the coordinated agency plans in a government-wide document. This document, entitled “Regulatory Program of the United States Government,” governed more than 20 major rulemaking agencies and was published each year during the second Reagan term and the Bush administration to inform Congress and the public of the government’s regulatory plans.

President Reagan, in 1987 and 1988, issued three additional executive orders, dealing with federalism, interference with property rights (which is still in effect), and the family. OMB was given a role in ensuring coordination of regulatory policy in these areas. President Bush basically continued the program of presidential review of agency rulemaking established by President Reagan, although due to congressional opposition to OIRA actions, President Bush’s nominee to head OIRA was not confirmed. To counter this weakening of OIRA’s authority, President Bush created the Council on Competitiveness, headed by Vice President Quayle, and gave it authority to intervene in major agency rulemakings. Several of the Council’s interventions provoked intense criticisms leading up to the 1992 elections.

The Clinton Executive Order—Executive Order 12866

With the election of President Clinton, one of his first actions was an attempt to reestablish some bipartisan consensus on rulemaking review. His nominee as OIRA Administrator was the first subcabinet nominee to be appointed. Following the example of the Reagan Administration, President Clinton then set out to redraft the extant Executive Order and produced Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, on September 30, 1993. This Executive Order, which remains operative, carries over many of the principles of Executive Order 12291 and Executive Order 12498 and made some significant modifications that simplified the process, made it more selective, and introduced more transparency into the OMB/agency consultations. In drafting this Executive Order, the Clinton Administration followed many of the suggestions in ACUS Recommendation 88-9.

The Executive Order begins with a lengthy “Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles,” which are quite similar to those in Executive Order 12291 except that it specifies that measurement of costs and benefits should include both quantifiable and qualitative measures. As with previous Orders, Executive Order 12866 retains the traditional (since 1978) level of $100 million annual effect on the economy for those major rules (now referred to as “economically significant” rules) that must be accompanied by cost-benefit assessments when forwarded to OIRA as proposed and final rules.

Executive Order 12866 also retains the OIRA review process for other rules, although it only requires that “significant regulatory actions” be subject to review. This includes those $100 million rules plus others that have material adverse effects on “the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” It also includes rules that may materially alter the budgetary impact of benefit programs or the rights of recipients, that raise “novel legal or policy issues,” or are inconsistent or interfere with actions taken by another agency. The process established for identifying such “significant regulatory actions” relies on agency identification of them in the first instance, vetted by OIRA. Rules that are not so identified may be issued without OIRA review. This selectivity streamlined the review process considerably and made it possible to include, for the first time, a deadline (of 90 days, with one 30-day extension allowed) for completion of OIRA review. In the event of an unresolved dispute between OIRA and the agency, the Vice President is directed to make the decision (or recommend one to the President).

The review process set forth in the Executive Order made significant improvements in transparency. Following an ACUS recommendation closely, it provides that after the agency has concluded its rulemaking it should make available to the public all submissions to OIRA and identify all changes made in the rule, noting those made at the behest of OIRA. In addition, OIRA, for its part, must regularize the way it receives any outside communications concerning an agency rule that is subject to review. Only the Administrator or her designee may receive such communications. OIRA must forward any such communications to the agency within ten days, invite agency officials to any meetings held with outsiders, and maintain a public log of all such contacts. At the end of the proceeding OIRA must also make available all documents exchanged with the agency.

In place of the Reagan Executive Order 12498 on regulatory planning, the Clinton Order establishes its own yearly planning mechanism. It continues the semiannual publication of the Unified Regulatory Agenda, which lists all proposed, pending, and completed regulatory and deregulatory actions. And it requires that the October Agenda contain each agency’s annual Regulatory Plans, which must be approved personally by the agency head. These plans must be forwarded to OIRA (and then on to affected agencies, the Vice President and a group of named high-level White House Advisors) by June 1 of each year. The plans are supposed to also include agency determinations on which existing rules are to be reviewed and reconsidered during the ensuing year and “preliminary estimates of the anticipated costs and benefits” of each rule planned for that calendar year. These actions do not represent any sharp break from the practices of previous administrations. However, Executive Order 12866 is a departure in one regard—for the first time the independent regulatory agencies are specifically directed to comply with the planning and agenda provisions (though not with the rule-review process).

The Clinton Executive Order was generally well received by most observers of the regulatory scene. Its basic approach has remained fundamentally unchanged since its issuance, and OIRA has worked out a stable and workable relationship with the agencies in administering it. The once rather vibrant legal and policy debate over the pros and cons of presidential review has gradually evolved into a fairly broad agreement that it is legal and, if properly administered, is essential to effective executive branch management. Nevertheless, there has been some serious criticism of OIRA’s failure to meet the deadlines set in the Order.

President Clinton also issued a presidential directive on plain language and number of other executive orders that remain in effect concerning: environmental justice in minority populations and low-income populations (Executive Order 12898), civil justice reform (Executive Order 12988), protection of children from environmental risks (Executive Order 13045), federalism (Executive Order 13132), and consultation with Indian Tribal Governments (Executive Order 13175).

President Bush continued the use of Executive Order 12866, although he did make several significant changes. In 2002, he made some small changes in Executive Order 13258, Amending Executive Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review, basically removing the Vice President from the process. In January 2007, in Executive Order 13422, Further Amendment to Executive Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review, he made more fundamental changes. Most significantly he added a requirement that “significant guidance documents” also be reviewed by OIRA in a way similar to significant regulatory actions. He also required that agencies identify in writing specific “market failures” that necessitate a rulemaking, that agency Regulatory Policy Officers be presidential appointees, that these officers must approve the Regulatory Plan, that aggregate costs and benefits for all rules must be included in the Regulatory Plan, and that agencies consider whether to use “formal” (“on the record”) rulemaking for “complex determinations.” However, as mentioned below, President Obama, upon assuming office, revoked the Bush changes and reinstated the original Clinton order. However, by later memorandum, the requirement that significant guidance documents be reviewed by OIRA was reinstated.

OIRA did issue a memorandum in September 2001 putting its own stamp on the Executive Order 12866 process. The memorandum describes the “general principles and procedures that will be applied by OMB in the implementation of Executive Order 12866 and related statutory and executive authority.”

Significantly, during the Bush Administration, OIRA also announced several new initiatives in its review process. First, it made extensive use of its website to publish its guidelines and other information pertaining to its review process and specific rule reviews. This continues today. Second, it began the practice of issuing public “return letters” that send rules back to the agency for reconsideration, “review letters” that comment on aspects of a particular rule review, and “prompt letters,” which are sent on OMB’s initiative and contain suggestions for new or stronger regulations. While these letters are still posted on reginfo.gov, the Obama and the Trump Administrations have made little use of this practice.

More importantly, during the Bush Administration, OMB issued four far-reaching documents affecting the regulatory process that remain in effect today. In 2003 it issued a revised OMB Circular A-4, which provides guidance on the development of regulatory analyses. OMB also issued a more far-reaching and controversial Peer Review Bulletin in December 2004, which requires administrative agencies to conduct a peer review on all “influential regulatory information that the agency intends to disseminate.” Finally, in 2007, OMB issued an important new government-wide Bulletin on Good Guidance Practices. It also (along with the Office of Science and Technology Policy) issued a set of Updated Principles for Risk Analysis. In so doing it declined to finalize a Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin that the two agencies had issued in January 2006, in favor of updating the Clinton Administration’s Principles issued in 1995. Finally, President Bush issued two other executive orders concerning regulations that remain in effect today: (1) analysis of adverse effects on energy supply, distribution, or use (Executive Order 13211) and (2) proper consideration of small entities in agency rulemaking (Executive Order 13272).

Developments in the Obama Administration

Shortly after taking office, President Obama revoked the Bush Amendments to Executive Order 12866 and directed the Director of OMB, in consultation with regulatory agencies, to produce a set of recommendations for a new executive order on federal regulatory review within 100 days, followed by an unusual request for public comments on the same subject. Almost 200 public comments were received.

After about a year of internal consideration, the White House finally settled on its approach to OMB review—basically to reaffirm Executive Order 12866—with Executive Order 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review on January 18, 2011. In Section 1(b), the Order stated: “This order is supplemental to and reaffirms the principles, structures, and definitions governing contemporary regulatory review that were established in Executive Order 12866.”

It did contain a few new mandates and points of emphasis. Most notably, agencies were urged (as appropriate and within legal constraints) to (1) consider “values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts”; (2) “afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment through the Internet on any proposed regulation, with a comment period that should generally be at least 60 days”; (3) “provide, for both proposed and final rules, timely online access to the rulemaking docket on regulations.gov, including relevant scientific and technical findings, in an open format that can be easily searched and downloaded”; (4) for proposed rules, provide “an opportunity for public comment on all pertinent parts of the rulemaking docket, including relevant scientific and technical findings”; (5) seek public input from affected persons “[b]efore issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking”; (6) “identify and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice”; (7) “promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned”; and (8) “[w]ithin 120 days of the date of this order, . . . develop and submit to [OIRA] a preliminary plan” for periodically reviewing “its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such regulations should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so as to make the agency’s regulatory program more effective or less burdensome in achieving the regulatory objectives.”

The one action mandate in the new Executive Order was for agencies to develop plans for retrospective review of their existing regulations. On May 26, 2011, the OIRA Administrator announced the results of this effort. On July 11, 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13579, Regulation and Independent Regulatory Agencies, which extended the terms of Executive Order 13563 to independent regulatory agencies. On September 15, 2015, President Obama issued Executive Order 13707, Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People. Noting the value of insights from behavioral science to improve the “effectiveness and efficiency of Government.”

Developments in the Trump Administration

Shortly after taking office, President Trump issued Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, which requires agencies to identify at least two regulations to be repealed for every proposed or promulgated regulation. The cost of each new regulation must be fully offset by the repeal specified above, and the agency must provide an approximation of the total costs or savings associated with each new regulation or repealed regulation. All regulations must be included in the Unified Agenda, and during the federal budget process, the OMB Director must identify to agencies a total amount of incremental costs of regulations permitted for that fiscal year. The order directed the Director of OMB to provide agency heads with guidance addressing the processes for measuring regulatory costs, the costs of existing regulations, what qualifies as new and offsetting regulations, and situations that would require waivers of the order’s requirements. OIRA issued Guidance Implementing Executive Order 13771, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs” to assist agencies in carrying out these requirements.

President Trump also issued Executive Order 13777, Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda. This order requires the head of each agency to designate an official as its Regulatory Reform Officer (RRO) who would implement initiatives and policies including Executive Order 13771, Executive Order 12866, and Section 6 of Executive Order 13563 regarding retrospective review. All agencies must also form a Regulatory Reform Task Force made up of the RRO, the Regulatory Policy Officer, a representative from the central policy office, and three senior agency officials if the agency is listed in 31 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1) (the executive departments, EPA, and NASA), which “shall evaluate existing regulations . . . and make recommendations to the agency head regarding their repeal, replacement, or modification.” In making these determinations, the task forces should focus on regulations that (1) “eliminate jobs, or inhibit job creation;” (2) “are outdated, unnecessary, or ineffective;” (3) “impose costs that exceed benefits;” (4) “create serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with regulatory initiatives and policies;” (5) “are inconsistent with the requirements of section 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001, . . . in particular those regulations that rely in whole or in part on data, information, or methods that are not publicly available or that are insufficiently transparent to meet the standard for reproducibility; or” (6) “derive from or implement Executive Orders or other Presidential directives that have been subsequently rescinded or substantially modified.” The Executive Order also requires agency heads to prioritize regulations that the Regulatory Reform Task Force identifies as outdated, unnecessary, or ineffective when implementing regulatory offsets under Executive Order 13771.

Finally, President Trump issued Executive Order 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, which directs agencies to review regulations that “potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources and appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind those that unduly burden the development of domestic energy resources.” This order also revoked Executive Order 13653, Preparing the United States for the Impact of Climate Change, and memoranda under the Obama Administration related to climate change.

Developments in the Biden Administration

Within his first two months in office, President Biden rescinded several of President Trump’s executive orders related to the rulemaking process. In addition, President Biden issued a memorandum titled Modernizing Regulatory Review. This memorandum explicitly reaffirms Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563. Additionally, it directs the OMB Director to work with agencies to produce a set of recommendations that improves and modernizes regulatory review. The memorandum specifies that these recommendations should include concrete suggestions on how the regulatory review process can “promote public health and safety, economic growth, social welfare, racial justice, environmental stewardship, human dignity, equity, and the interests of future generations.” Furthermore, the memorandum specifies that the recommendations should, among other actions, include proposed reforms to Circular A-4 to promote these goals; suggest procedures that take into account distributional impacts in regulatory analyses; propose how OIRA can partner with agencies to “explore, promote, and undertake regulatory initiatives that are likely to yield significant benefits”; and determine an appropriate approach to the review of guidance documents.

Bibliography

Congressional Documents

OMB/OIRA Documents

Reports to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations

Other OMB Documents

  • Regulatory Program of the United States Government (1987-1988) (and through 1990-91).
  • Report on Executive Order No. 12866, 59 Fed. Reg. 24276 (May 10, 1994).
  • More Benefits Fewer Burdens—Creating a Regulatory System that Works For the American People, A Report to the President on the Third Anniversary of Executive Order 12866 (1996).

ACUS Documents

Recommendations

CRS Documents

  • Maeve P. Carey, RL32240, The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview (June 17, 2013).
  • Maeve P. Carey, R41974, Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process (Dec. 9, 2014).
  • Vivian S. Chu & Daniel T. Shedd, R42720, Presidential Review of Independent Regulatory Commission Rulemaking: Legal Issues (Sept. 10, 2012).
  • Vivian S. Chu & Daniel T. Shedd, RS20846, Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation (Apr. 6, 2014).
  • Curtis Copeland, RL33862, Changes to the OMB Regulatory Review Process by Executive Order 13422 (Jan. 3, 2008).
  • Curtis Copeland, RL32397, Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (June 9, 2009).

GAO Documents

Other Government Documents

Selected Books and Articles

Miscellaneous